ABC Dooyeweerd 6: Calvin, Augustine, Descartes

ABC Doooyeweerd 6
(illustration free for non-profit re-use)

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CONTEXT of QUOTE:

The Cartesian "Cogito" in contra-distinction to the theoretic nous as the Archimedian point of Greek metaphysics.

     After much preparation in various sorts of directions (especially in the system of NICOLAUS CUSANUS) the principles of Humanistic philosophical thought received their first clear formulation in the system of DESCARTES. The cogito in which this thinker supposed he had found his Archimedean point is in no sense identical with the "logos" or "nous" ["mind, reason, intellect"] of classic Greek philosophy. In the latter, human reason was conceived of as bound to an objective metaphysical order of being in which the thinking subject only has a part. This metaphysical order was considered as the standard of truth in respect to theoretical thought. Quite different from this Greek conception of reason is that of the founder of Humanistic philosophy.

     By means of the "cogito" DESCARTES called to a halt the universal methodical scepticism with respect to all the data of experience. The given world should be broken up in a methodical theoretical way in order to reconstruct it from autonomous mathematical thought. It is the new ideal of personality which is active behind this philosophical experiment. It does not accept any order or law that the sovereign personality of man had not itself prescribed in rational thought. Although DESCARTES substantialized this cogito to a "res cogitans" ["thinking thing/entity"], and thereby seemed to fall back upon scholastic metaphysics, no one should fail to recognize that in his new regulatives for methodical thought the Humanistic motive of freedom and of the domination of nature is the driving force.

     From his "cogito, ergo sum" the French thinker directly proceeds to the Idea of God, and therein discovers the foundation of all further knowledge. This Idea of God is nothing but the absolutizing of mathematical thought to divine thought, which cannot mislead us. The whole Idea of God serves to imprint upon the new mathematical method the mark of infallibility.

     The Jansenists of Port Royal who accepted Cartesianism as an exact method of thinking, supposed they had found an inner affinity between DESCARTES' founding of all knowledge in self-consciousness and the immanent Idea of God, and AUGUSTINE'S "Deum et animam scire volo" ["I wish to know God and soul"]. This was a grave error.

There is no relationship between DESCARTES' and AUGUSTINE'S Archimedean point. The misconception of the Jansenists of Port Royal on this issue.

     For this inner affinity does not exist, in spite of the appearance of the contrary. In an unsurpassed manner CALVIN expounded in his Institutio the authentic Christian conception of AUGUSTINE which made all knowledge of the cosmos dependent upon self-knowledge, and made our self-knowledge dependent upon our knowledge of God. Moreover, CALVIN dissociated this conception from AUGUSTINE'S scholastic standpoint with regard to philosophy as "ancilla theologiae" ["handmaid of theology"]. This view is radically opposed to the conception of DESCARTES. In his "cogito", the latter implicitly proclaimed the sovereignty of mathematical thought and deified it in his Idea of God, in a typically Humanistic attitude towards knowledge.

     Consequently, there is no inner connection between AUGUSTINE'S refutation of scepticism by referring to the certainty of thought which doubts, and DESCARTES' "cogito, ergo sum". AUGUSTINE never intended to declare the naturalis ratio [natural reason] to be autonomous and unaffected by the fall.

(Herman Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, Part 2, pp195-196)

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CALVIN -

"Toute la somme de nostre saigesse, laquelle mérite d'estre appellée vraie et certaine saigesse, est quasi comprinse en deux parties, à sçavoir la congnoissance de Dieu, et de nousmesmes...Ainsi par le sentiment de nostre petitesse, rudesse, vanité, mesmes aussi perversité et corruption, nous recongnoissons que la vraie grandeur, sapience, verité, justice et pureté gist en Dieu. Finalement nous sommes esmeuz par noz misères à considerer les biens du Seigneur, et ne pouvons pas affectueusement aspirer à luy, devant que nous aions commencé de nous desplaire du tout en nousmesmes. Car qui est celuy des hommes qui ne reposast voluntiers en soy mesmes? qui est celuy qui n'y repose pour le temps que, se mescongnoissant, il est content de ses propres facultez, et ne voit point sa calamité? Parquoy un chascun de nous n'est seulement incité à chercher Dieu par la congnoissance de soymesme, mais est conduict et quasi mené par la main à le trouver. D'autre part il est notoire, que l'homme ne vient jamais à la claire congnoissance de soy mesme, sinon que premièrement il est contemplé la face du Seigneur, et aprez l'avoir considerée, descende à se regarder. Car ceste arrogance est enracinée en nous tous: que tousjours il nous semble advis que nous sommes juste, et veritables, saiges et sainctz, sinon que par signes évidens nous soyons convaincuz d'injustice, mensonge, folie et immundicitée. Or nous n'en sommes point convaincuz si nous regardons seulement à nous, et non au Seigneur pareillement; qui est la reigle unicque, à laquelle il fault que ce jugement soit conforme." (Jean Calvin, Institution de la Religion Chrestienne, Société d'Edition "Les Belles Lettres", présenté par Jacques Pannier, Paris 1961)

"Our wisdom, in so far as it ought to be deemed true and solid Wisdom, consists almost entirely of two parts: the knowledge of God and of ourselves. But as these are connected together by many ties, it is not easy to determine which of the two precedes and gives birth to the other. For, in the first place, no man can survey himself without forthwith turning his thoughts towards the God in whom he lives and moves; because it is perfectly obvious, that the endowments which we possess cannot possibly be from ourselves; nay, that our very being is nothing else than subsistence in God alone... and, indeed, we cannot aspire to Him in earnest until we have begun to be displeased with ourselves. For what man is not disposed to rest in himself? Who, in fact, does not thus rest, so long as he is unknown to himself; that is, so long as he is contented with his own endowments, and unconscious or unmindful of his misery? Every person, therefore, on coming to the knowledge of himself, is not only urged to seek God, but is also led as by the hand to find him. On the other hand, it is evident that man never attains to a true self-knowledge until he has previously contemplated the face of God, and come down after such contemplation to look into himself. For (such is our innate pride) we always seem to ourselves just, and upright, and wise, and holy, until we are convinced, by clear evidence, of our injustice, vileness, folly, and impurity. Convinced, however, we are not, if we look to ourselves only, and not to the Lord also —He being the only standard by the application of which this conviction can be produced. " (John Calvin, The Institutes of the Christian Religion, chap 1:1, 1:2, trans. by Henry Beveridge)

ABC Dooyeweerd 5: Kant's Starting-point

ABC Dooyeweerd 5: Kant's Starting-point
"Portrait of Immanuel Kant" (1724-1804) German School (Wiki)
"The Conjurer" (Estimated 1475-1505) Hieronymus Bosch:  (Wiki)

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     CONTEXT of QUOTE:

     Kant…held to the dogma of the autonomy of theoretical thought. Therefore he was obliged to seek the central reference point of the theoretical synthesis in the logical aspect of thought, which he calls understanding.

     The notion, "I think," so he says, must necessarily accompany all my representations if they are to be altogether my representations. But this “I think" is according to him only that subjective logical pole of thought which can never become the object of my thinking since it is the logical center from which every act of thinking must start. Kant calls this supposed logical center of theoretical thought the "transcendental logicial unity of apperception," or also the transcendental logical subject, or “ego”. He assumes that it is a subjective logical unity of an absolutely simple character, so that it is indeed a central unity without a single multiplicity or diversity of components. This transcendental-logical I is, according to Kant, to be distinguished sharply from the empirical ego, the psycho-physical human person, which we can perceive in time and space. It does not belong to empirical reality. It is much rather the general condition of any possible act of thought; and as such it has no individuality of any kind. It is the theoretical-logical subject to which all empirical reality can be opposed as its object counter-pole, its object of knowledge and experience.

     Kant emphasizes that from this transcendental logical notion, “I think”, not an iota of self-knowledge is to be gained, since our knowledge is restricted to the sensorily perceptible phenomena in time and space, which are the very object of the logical I. But has Kant succeedcd in showing a real starting-point of the theoretical synthesis within the logical aspect of thought itself? The answer must be negative. We have seen that the reference point of the theoretical synthesis cannot be found within the theoretical antithesis between the logical aspect and the non-logical aspects of experience, which are made into the problem of analytical inquiry. But Kant's transcendental-logical subject is exactly conceived of as the subjective-logical pole of this antithesis. As such it can never be the central reference point of our experience in the temporal order with its diversity of modal aspects.

     The "cogito" from which Kant starts cannot be a merely logical unity. It implies the fundamental relation between the ego and its acts of thought, which can by no means be identical. A logical unity, on the other hand, can never be an absolute unity without multiplicity. This contradicts the modal nature of the logical aspect. Thus Kant's view of the transcendental ego lands in pure mythology. It implies an intrinsically contradictory identification of the central "I" with its subjective logical function.

     To maintain the dogma of the autonomy of theoretical thought, Kant has allowed the real starting-point of his critique of theoretical reason to remain in the dark. It is the task of our radical critique to uncover it.

(Herman Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight of Western Thought: Studies in the Pretended Autonomy of Theoretical Thought, General Editor D.F.M. Strauss, Paideia Press, 2012)

ABC Dooyeweerd 4: Arché

ABC Dooyeweerd 4: Arché

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CONTEXT of QUOTE:

How does philosophical thought attain to the Idea of the totality of meaning?

     The proper character of philosophical thought, as we have said, may never be disregarded with impunity. Philosophical thought is theoretic thought directed towards the totality of meaning.

     Therefore, I must first give my thought a fixed direction in the idea of the totality of meaning. 

     If this idea (1) is not to remain completely without content, if it is to succeed in showing a direction to my philosophical thought, then it must be possible that I, who am to practise philosophy, should choose my standpoint in this totality of meaning of our temporal cosmos. For, unless such a standpoint can be found, the latter will remain strange to me. In my central selfhood I must participate in the totality of meaning, if I am to have the idea of it in my philosophical thought.

     To speak in a figure: In the process of directing my philosophical thought in the idea towards the totality of meaning, I must be able to ascend a lookout-tower above all the modal speciality of meaning that functions within the coherence of the modal aspects. From this tower I must be able to survey this coherence with all the modal diversity of meaning included in it. Here I must find the point of reference to which this modal diversity can be related, and to which I am to return in the process of reflecting thought. In other words, if I am not to lose myself in the modal speciality of meaning during the course of philosophic thought, I must be able to find a standpoint which transcends the special modal aspects. Only by transcending the speciality of meaning, can I attain to the actual view of totality by which the former is to be distinguished as such.

The Archimedean point of philosophy and the tendency of philosophical thought towards the Origin.

     This fixed point from which alone, in the course of philosophical thought, we are able to form the idea of the totality of meaning, we call the Archimedean point of philosophy.

    However, if we have found this Archimedean point, our selfhood makes the discovery that the view of totality is not possible apart from a view of the origin or the ἀρχή (archē) of both totality and speciality of meaning.

     The totality in which our selfhood is supposed to participate may indeed transcend all speciality of meaning in the coherence of its diversity. Yet it, too, in the last analysis remains meaning which cannot exist by itself but supposes an ἀρχή (archē), an origin which creates meaning. 
     All meaning is from, through, and to an origin, which cannot itself be related to a higher ἀρχή (archē).

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(1) Translator's note: "Idea" is used here in the technical sense of a"limiting concept" which refers to a totality not to be comprehended inthe concept itself. W.Y.

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(Herman Dooyeweerd, New Critique of Theoretical Thought, Prolegomena, pp 7-9)

ABC Dooyeweerd 3: Inquietum

ABC Dooyeweerd 3: Inquietum
Acknowledgement: Portrait by Alan Wilson (after Rembrandt) 

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CONTEXT of QUOTE:

The restlessness of meaning in the tendency of philosophic thought towards the origin.

     This restlessness manifests itself in the tendency of philosophic thought to move toward the origin. It is essentially the restlessness of our ego which is actually operative in philosophic thought. It issues from our own selfhood, from the root of our existence. This restlessness is transmitted from the selfhood to all temporal functions in which this ego is actually operative.

     Inquietum est cor nostrum et mundus in corde nostro!

     Our selfhood is actually operative in philosophic thought. As certainly as philosophic self-reflection is impossible apart from the direction towards the ego, so certainly does it require to be directed towards the ἀρχή (arché) of our selfhood and of the totality of meaning. The ego must participate in this totality, if genuine thinking in terms of totality is to be possible.

     Philosophic thought as such derives its actuality from the ego. The latter restlessly seeks its origin in order to understand its own meaning, and in its own meaning the meaning of our entire cosmos!

     It is this tendency towards the origin which discloses the fact, that our ego is subjected to a central law. This law derives its fulness of meaning from the origin of all things and limits and determines the centre and root of our existence.

     Thus, a two-fold pre-supposition of philosophic thought is discovered at the outset. In the first place, philosophic thought pre-supposes an Archimedean point for the thinker, from which our ego in the philosophic activity of thought can direct its view of totality over the modal diversity of meaning. Secondly, it presupposes a choice of position in the Archimedean point in the face of the ἀρχή (arché), which transcends all meaning and in which our ego comes to rest in the process of philosophic thought. For, if the attempt is made to go beyond this ἀρχή (arché), the formulating of any question has no longer any meaning.

***

Reality as a continuous process of realization
     For the reality of a thing is indeed dynamic; it is a continuous realization in the transcendental temporal direction.
     The inner restlessness of meaning as the mode of being of created reality reveals itself in the whole temporal world. To seek a fixed point in the latter is to seek it in a "fata morgana", a mirage, a supposed thing-reality, lacking meaning as the mode of being which ever points beyond and above itself. There is indeed nothing in temporal reality in which our heart can rest, because this reality does not rest in itself.

(Herman Dooyeweerd, New Critique of Theoretical Thought, Prolegomena, pp 11-12 and Vol 3 p109)

ABC Dooyeweerd 2: Hidden Performer

ABC Dooyeweerd 2 (Gratis for non-profit use)

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CONTEXT of QUOTE:

The necessary religious transcending in the choice of the immanence-standpoint.

     By this original choice of a position, the attempt is made to detach the logical function of theoretical thought (whether only in the ἀρχή [archē] or in the archē and Archimedean point alike) from the inter-modal coherence of meaning and to treat it as independent. In the nature of the case, this choice is no act of a "transcendental subject of thought", which is merely an abstract concept. It is rather an act of the full self which transcends the diversity of modal aspects.

     And it is a religious act, just because it contains a choice of position in the concentration-point of our existence in the face of the Origin of meaning.

     In the choice of the immanence-standpoint in the manner described above, I myself elevate philosophic thought, whether in the transcendental-logical or in the metaphysical-logical sense, to the status of ἀρχή (archē) of the cosmos. This archē stands as origin, beyond which nothing meaningful may be further asked, and in my view no longer occupies the heteronomous mode of being which is meaning. It exists in and through itself.

     This choice of a position in the face of the arché transcends philosophic thought, though in the nature of the case it does not occur apart from it. It possesses the fulness of the central self-hood, the fulness of the heart. It is the first concentration of philosophic thought in a unity of direction. It is a religious choice of position in an idolatrous sense.

     The proclamation of the self-sufficiency of philosophic thought, even with the addition of "in its own field", is an absolutizing of meaning. Nothing of its idolatrous character is lost by reason of the thinker's readiness to recognize, that the absolutizing κάτ' ἐξοχήν [par excellence] which he performs in the theoretical field is by no means the only rightful claimant, but that philosophy should allow the religious, aesthetic or moral man the full freedom to serve other gods, outside the theoretical realm.

     The philosopher who allows this freedom to the non-theoretician is, so to speak, theoretically a  polytheist. He fights shy of proclaiming the theoretical God to be the only true one. But, within the temple of this God, no others shall be worshipped!

     Thus the first way of our critique of philosophical thought has for a provisional conclusion: Even on the immanence-standpoint the choice of the Archimedean point proves to be impossible as a purely theoretical act which prejudices nothing in a religious sense.

     In truth the selfhood as the religious root of existence is the hidden performer on the instrument of philosophic thought. Only, it is invisible on the basis of the immanence-standpoint.

     Actually, philosophic thought in itself offers us no Archimedean point, for it can function only in the cosmic coherence of the different modal aspects of meaning, which it nowhere transcends.

     The immanent Ideas of the inter-modal coherence of meaning and of the totality of meaning are transcendental limiting concepts. They disclose the fact that theoretical thought is not self-sufficient in the proper field of philosophy, a point to which we shall have to return in detail.

     No other possibility for transcending the inter-modal coherence and the modal diversity of meaning is to be found, except in the religious root of existence, from which philosophic thought also has to receive its central direction.

(Herman Dooyeweerd, New Critique of Theoretical Thought, Prolegomena, pp 20-21)

ABC Dooyeweerd 1: No Autonomous Thought

ABC Dooyeweerd 1: No Autonomous Thought (Graphic free for non-profit use)

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CONTEXT of QUOTE:

The dogma concerning the autonomy of theoretical thought as an impediment to philosophical discussion among the various schools.

     It appears again and again that this dogma impedes a mutual understanding among philosophic schools that prove to be fundamentally opposed in their true (though hidden) starting-point. This is a second ground for doubting its character as a purely theoretical axiom.

     For if all philosophical currents that claim to choose their standpoint in theoretical thought alone,  actually had no deeper presuppositions, it would be possible to convince an opponent of his error in a purely theoretical way.

     But, as a matter of fact, a Thomist has never succeeded by purely theoretical arguments in convincing a Kantian or a positivist of the tenability of a theoretical metaphysics. Conversely, the Kantian epistemology has not succeeded in winning over a single believing Thomist to critical idealism.

     In the debate among these philosophical schools, one receives the impression that they are reasoning at cross-purposes, because they are not able to find a way to penetrate to each other's true starting-points. The latter are masked by the dogma concerning the autonomy of theoretic thought. The same holds, for example, in the debate conducted by a positivist of the Vienna school with a Hegelian thinker or a Spinozist.

     This simple fact of experience, in the nature of the case, does not yet prove the impossibility of autonomous theoretical reflection in philosophy. But it is quite sufficient to show that it is necessary to make the autonomy of theoretical thought a critical problem and no longer to pass it off as a scientific axiom. This problem should be posed as a quaestio iuris. It touches the empirical sciences as well as philosophy, since both imply the theoretical attitude of thought.

The necessity of a transcendental criticism of the theoretical attitude of thought as such. The difference in principle between transcendent and transcendental criticism.

     The proper answering of the question raised above requires a transcendental criticism of the theoretical attitude of thought as such. By this we understand a critical inquiry (respecting no single so-called theoretical axiom) into the universally valid conditions which alone make theoretical thought possible, and which are required by the immanent structure of this thought itself. In this latter restriction lies the difference in principle between a transcendent and a transcendental criticism of science and philosophy.

     The former does not really touch the inner character and the immanent structure of the theoretical attitude of thought, but confronts, for instance Christian faith with the results of modern science and with the various philosophical systems, and thus ascertains, whether or not factual conflicts exist.

     It remains dogmatic, however, as long as it fails squarely to face the primary question, whether the theoretical attitude of thought itself, with reference to its inner structure, can be independent of supra-theoretical prejudices. With such a dogmatic, merely transcendent criticism, one constantly runs the risk of regarding as the result of unprejudiced science and philosophical reflection, something that appears upon critical inquiry to be the consequence of a masked religious prejudice and an anti-Christian attitude of faith. Besides, there is another ever present danger. What is actually a complex of philosophical ideas dominated by unbiblical motives may be accepted by dogmatic theology and accomodated to the doctrine of the church. The danger is that this complex of ideas will be passed off as an article of Christian faith, if it has inspired the terminology of some confessions of faith. Transcendent criticism, in other words, is valueless to science and philosophy, because it confronts with each other two different spheres whose inner point of contact is left completely in the dark. One can then just as well proceed to exercise criticism of science from the standpoint of art or politics!

     In order to guarantee from the outset a really critical attitude in philosophy, transcendental criticism of theoretical thought should come at the very beginning of philosophical reflection.

(Herman Dooyeweerd, New Critique of Theoretical Thought, Prolegomena, pp 36-38)

JC Sanford: Genetic Entropy & The Mystery of the Genome

This landmark book presents powerful evidence for creation. The author, a well-known ex Cornell University professor of genetics, shows how mutations and natural selection do not account for the information in the human genome. 3rd edition. 

£10 (Purchase book HERE)

______________________________________________

Dr John Sanford, Ph.D. (University of Wisconsin) was a Cornell University Professor for more than 25 years. He has published over 80 scientific publications and has been granted over 30 patents. His most significant scientific contributions involve three inventions, the biolistic (“gene gun”) process, pathogen-derived resistance, and genetic immunization. A large fraction of the transgenic crops (in terms of numbers and acreage) grown in the world today were genetically engineered using the gene gun technology developed by John and his collaborators.

____________________________________________

Related article by author J.C. Sanford - 

Critic ignores reality of Genetic Entropy

The author of a landmark book on genomic decay responds to unsustainable criticisms.

"This book cost me a great deal. I basically laid down my reputation and my career in order to say what I believe to be the truth. I believe the real deception is clearly the Primary Axiom [Man is merely the product of random mutations plus natural selection]. I am still convinced I can persuade any impartial person that the Primary Axiom is indefensible (if they will listen). So why would I lie? I am a sincere orthodox Christian, I believe God will judge me in a very literal sense, and I consider lying is a very serious sin. I am distinguished in my field and I greatly value my integrity as an honest scientist. Yet my integrity as a Christian is much more important to me than my scientific standing. That is why I have been willing to defend what I believe to be true, even knowing that attacking this sacred cow (the Primary Axiom) would bring slander and scorn."

Read full article HERE

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Hans Rookmaaker: Complete Works

 

     It was in a German PoW camp during WW2 that Hans Rookmaaker read the Bible and so got converted. It was there also that he first read Herman Dooyeweerd, who deeply influenced his thinking and so his academic career after the war. Rookmaaker became a History of Art Professor in the Free University of Amsterdam (where Dooyeweerd was Professor of Philosophy of Law). He was also an authority on Blues music. I had the privilege of chauffeuring Hans Rookmaaker around a snowy Scotland on a university art lecture tour in the early 1970s, though I was too young and introvert to ask the questions I would love to ply him with now. Sadly he died unexpectedly in 1977, aged only 55.

     William Edgar, a jazz musician himself (and an editor of recent Cornelius Van Til re-editions), writes of Rookmaaker's musical interests: 

     "Hans Rookmaaker spoke of the great artistry and authenticity of Victoria Spivey, Texas Alexander, Bumble Bee Slim, Blind Willie Johnson, and a host of other founders of classic black music. Not only was Rookmaaker the European editor of Fontana Record's series, Treasures of North American Negro Music, but he had been to America and met Thomas A. Dorsey, Mahalia Jackson, and Langston Hughes. What was the attraction of jazz to this Dutch art historian? For that is what he was during his professional career. He said it often in his lectures and throughout his writings. It put iron into the blood! Discussing his hero, Joseph "King" Oliver, he compares the New Orleans cornetist's orchestral sounds to the music of J. S. Bach. He finds very similar musical qualities in the baroque polyphony of the Brandenburg Concertos and Oliver's Creole Jazz Band from the 1920s. Not only the technical structure, but the mood and atmosphere are similar. Especially, he finds in both of them joy, true joy, not romantic escape. In stark contrast to Theodor Adorno's attacks on jazz, which found it "unruly," "rebellious," and "emasculating," Rookmaaker describes it as orderly, harmonious, and full of vigor. The opposite of joy for him is happiness, or the escapism of those who look for depth in the tragic and ruinous. And the ultimate source of true joy, whether in jazz or any other human expression, is biblical Christian faith, which Bach and Oliver shared." ("Why All This?": Rediscovering the witness of Hans Rookmaaker, William Edgar 2006). (Article available online HERE)

     Hans Rookmaaker writes of Dooyeweerd's influence:

     "In the course of the years [Francis] Schaeffer and I discussed many things, among which philosophy and particularly Dooyeweerd’s philosophy were favourite topics. Dooyeweerd’s ideas have had an influence on Schaeffer and L’Abri in that way. Of course Schaeffer incorporated these ideas in his own thinking and continued on. Neither of us is a slavish pupil of Dooyeweerd. I make quite an effort not to use his difficult terminology, which in a way belonged to the style of the 1930s. So you will not find Dooyeweerd’s vocabulary in our discussions at L’Abri, but his thoughts are there just the same.
     Dooyeweerd himself wrote a good and short introduction to his work called In The Twilight of Western Thought. In the first part of that book he asks the question how Western thought is to be approached. Is it really Christian and if not, what is it? Escape from Reason [Full book free online in French as "Démission de la raison"] is Schaeffer’s version of what Dooyeweerd develops in those chapters. They both talk for instance about nature and grace and about the influence of Greek concepts. Dooyeweerd tries to trace the various ways of thinking in Western history to their starting points. A starting point can be defined as the basic answers that are given to basic questions like: What is the world? Who is God? or What is the source of this world? The answers given to those questions colour the answers that are given to all other questions. The second part of Dooyeweerd’s book deals with a truly Christian approach to reality. Firstly it is basic to such an approach that we begin with a world that is created. Secondly we hold that this world is fallen, it is not perfect. But thirdly we say that this is not the end, there is redemption as Christ came to redeem this world. On the basis of these truths we can try to grasp reality and analyse how this world is made. Dooyeweerd then proceeds to give such an analysis." (Hans Rookmaaker 'A Dutch view of Christian philosophy' The Complete Works of Hans Rookmaaker edited by Marleen Hengelaar-Rookmaaker Vol 6 Part III The L'Abri Lectures. Piquant, 2005)

The Complete Works of Hans Rookmaaker are available from PIQUANT Editions HERE

(Reduced from £150.00 to £49.99)

CONTENTS:

1. Art, Artists and Gauguin

2. New Orleans Jazz, Mahalia Jackson and the Philosophy of Art
3. The Creative Gift, Dürer, Dada and Desolation Row
4. Western Art and the Meanderings of a Culture
5. Modern Art and the Death of a Culture
6. Our Calling and God’s Hand in History

ALSO, the above Complete Works are available from
PIQUANT Editions on CD-Rom HERE

(Reduced from £20.00 to £2.49)!!
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A full AUDIO: "The Artist Needs No Justification" 
by Hans Rookmaaker can be listened to free HERE
_____________________________________________
Download PDF of Hans Rookmaaker's:
"A R T Needs No Justification" HERE

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Faic cuideachd:

Seasick Steve, Dooyeweerd, Rookmaaker, Van Til, Schaeffer
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Bible and Slavery (deleted comment)

Caribbean Manacles

     The following response to a (Christian) national blog article was deleted without explanation by the comments administrator -

     The Bible surely projects more rays of light on this than the article suggests. From the outset Genesis informs us that we are all made in the image of God. This is a dazzling assertion of baseline equal dignity for all humanity. 

     Leviticus, quoted by Christ, enjoins us to "Love your neighbour as yourself" (19:18). Fulfilling this command is incompatible with slavery. Christ reinforces this implication by pointing to a racially despised Samaritan as the epitome of a good neighbour. 

     Let us also be careful to distinguish between "description" and "prescription" in the OT, and wary of a simplistic, anachronistic transposition of the horrific conditions of modern black slavery back into the Bible. Cf, in that regard, the following verse alone:

      "And an owner who knocks out the tooth of a male or female slave must let the slave go free to compensate for the tooth." (Exodus 21:27)

     The article's dismissive reference to the New Testament Philemon letter is unhelpfully superficial and fails to note the revolutionary (given the context of Roman rule) light switched on therein - even if, like one of those modern energy saving bulbs, full illumination of what the manacled Paul is enjoining with regards to the slave Onesimus takes a moment or two to properly dawn (but then, maybe the blindness is culpably our own) -

     "I am sending him—who is my very heart—back to you. I would have liked to keep him with me so that he could take your place in helping me while I am in chains for the gospel. But I did not want to do anything without your consent, so that any favor you do would not seem forced but would be voluntary. Perhaps the reason he was separated from you for a little while was that you might have him back forever— no longer as a slave, but better than a slave, as a dear brother. He is very dear to me but even dearer to you, both as a fellow man and as a brother in the Lord. So if you consider me a partner, welcome him as you would welcome me." (Philemon 1:12-17)

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