samedi, juin 30, 2012

Cairngorms National Park, Gaelic signage, and the Price of Cheese...

CAIRNGORMS NATIONAL PARK, 
GAELIC SIGNAGE, 
and the PRICE OF CHEESE... 
Three Letters to the Cairngorms National Park Authority concerning their deplorable use of Gaelic on A9 signage. Please make your own views known to them -
http://www.cairngorms.co.uk/park-authority/contact/
Most recent style of signage

Previous style of signage (Photo by Thelma Stuart)
Dear Sir,

As someone concerned about the use of Gaelic I wish to express my utter despair at the "bilingual" signs for the Cairngorms National Park erected recently on the A9. Heading south, the Gaelic is illegible until one is at the sign. Heading north, and therefore being on the lane farthest from the sign, the Gaelic remains totally illegible. The signs, of course, have at least half their surface blank. Plenty of space. For the life of me I cannot fathom the mindset which thoughtfully chooses for the English a good font size, colour and style calculated to register with passing traffic, then abandons all design and functional issues for the Gaelic. Are Gaelic-speakers supposed to doff their caps and be honoured with these few crumbs from the rich man's table? Such patronising semiotics would get very short shrift in Wales, as you no doubt well know. I urge the Cairngorms National Park Authority to catch the vision for the conservation and promotion not just of our natural heritage, but insofar as the CNPA uses words, for the Gaelic linguistic heritage which gave a name to every peak, slope, stream and loch etc within your jurisdiction. The Cairngorms National Park Authority cannot be neutral on the matter of Gaelic, as if your remit does not extend to linguistic matters. You must be aware that, intentionally or not, you are helping to extirpate Gaelic unless you actively use it. And not with a token nod, such as the heading on your webpage, or the crass small print of those road signs. Not decoratively but functionally. I say again, functionally.

Yours sincerely,

Fearghas Macfhionnlaigh.

*************

Dear Sir,

I wrote (via your website) a number of months ago on the above matter, but received no reply. It has now come to my attention that you intend to put up new signs, but that you have decided to keep the Gaelic smaller than the English because otherwise this would apparently "present too much material on the one sign and compromise the overall design". I wish to express my outrage at this sort of inane nonsense being proffered as a serious rationale. For insufferable and vital decades Gaelic-speakers have had to endure such insulting and patronising claptrap from officialdom. You may not quite appreciate just how depressingly numerous your forbears are. So many patter-merchants! What mock-gravitas you have all brought as you have shaken your heads and intoned your po-faced pretexts. Let's tell it how it is, shall we? Where Gaelic is absent from road-signs it is because some partisan decision-maker wants it that way. Where Gaelic is present on signs but is small and/or faint, it is because some decision-maker considers it of corresponding consequence. If for some irksome technicality Gaelic MUST appear on a sign, then the knack is, correct me if I'm wrong, to make sure it is as unobtrusive as possible. I strongly suggest that "not compromising the overall design" is simply your code for "not compromising the paramount functionality of the English". I happen to be an art teacher. I find it less than likely that your commissioned designer came back to you with proposals that all required smaller Gaelic for the sake of the integrity of the "design". A designer works to the brief given. If the remit is to make sure that the Gaelic and English are of equal prominence and functionality, then the designer loses the commission if he/she doesn't produce the goods. We call this "equality" concept, bilingualism. One or two other countries have managed to get their heads round it without, as far as I know, designers having nervous breakbowns.

Signs are signals. The nigh-invisible non-functional Gaelic on your current signs simply signals a grudging tokenism towards the language. It signals disparagement. Let's at least have some honesty for once. You know perfectly well that if the Cairngorms National Park decided tomorrow to have trilingual signage in, let's say, English, French, and Japanese, no insoluble logistical issues would preclude it. Designers worth their salt would enjoy the challenge. You know that. You know that very well. So to attempt to palm off the Gaels, who named everything you can see out of your window, with talk of "too much material on one sign" and of "compromising the overall design", is exasperating in the extreme. I ask you yet again, have you ever been to Wales?

Yours sincerely,

Fearghas MacFhionnlaigh.
*******************

Dear Mr Ferguson,   

      Thank you for your courteous reply. If I might respond to your key sentence. One would have thought that whatever the "range of views" on your signage, the most equitable resolution would be an even-handed bilingualism. But apparently not. And then I wonder if you are still talking in code here. It is difficult to imagine that there are "a range of views" in the Gaelic camp, though my jaw HAS indeed dropped more than once in the past when Gaelic-speakers have stood up and presented heartfelt arguments against the use of their own language. But apart from such aberrations, it is surely safe to assume that Gaels who have contacted you will have been pretty much univocal in favour of maximum promotion of Gaelic. It is also unlikely that these Gaels are arguing for no English at all on the signs, or for a "bottom-line-of-the-optician's-chart" presence for the English. Therefore, when you say "people have a range of views on the design" I must surmise that you primarily mean "English-speakers have a range of views on the design". I suppose this "range" might in principle stretch from those happy to see equal status given to both languages, down through a spectrum of increasing prejudice until we reach the "Gaelic-can-go-to-hell-in-a-wheelie-bin" contingent. The current political climate is slightly less favourable to that latter position than was the case. Also, you are already on record as saying that Gaelic WILL be on the signage, though smaller than the English. We can therefore conclude that Cairngorms National Park feels that it is doing justice to the "range of views on the design" by opting for MODERATE prejudice against Gaelic rather than EXTREME prejudice.

     As the traveller approaches the precincts of the Cairngorms National Park, I anticipate that he/she will pass what is in effect an English sign with some small and/or pale subtext (Gaelic), thoughtfully 'designed' not to intrude beyond one's peripheral vision. The Highland Council's own logo [now amended [2012)] could well have been your designer's, as they say in education circles, "exemplar". Lack of room on the sign will not have been the issue. There will be plenty of blank space. But that blank space will have priority over the Gaelic. Quite "Zen" really, when you think about it.

     Clearly it is not "possible to please everyone" if "everyone" includes those of both pro- and anti-Gaelic convictions. But just who, in fact, WILL your proposed (already ordered?) signage please? Certainly not the Gaelic-speaker. Nor the fair-minded English-speaker. Nor the outright antipathetic English-speaker. You will have pleased only that stratum of English-speaker which is willing to smile upon Gaelic as long as it sits quietly in a corner. Like a well-behaved deerhound perhaps. Decorative in its own way. Majestic even. But an indulgence, nevertheless. "A creature of Fingalian legend, you know. But rather short-lived. Sad, really. Now, what were we saying? Oh, yes, the price of cheese..."

Yours sincerely,

Fearghas MacFhionnlaigh.

Carl Wieland: Uisgeachan Ruaimleach

UISGEACHAN RUAIMLEACH: Roghnachadh nàdarra fo cheist 
Eadar-theangaichte bhon tùs-aiste Bheurla:
 'Muddy Waters' le Carl Wieland

     Gu tric thèid "roghnachadh nàdarra" a mhìneachadh mar "seasamh na feadhna as comasaiche" (neo, nas fhaisge air ar là fhèin, mar "sìolachadh na feadhna as comasaiche"). Tha mòran dhaoine air iomrall a thaobh seo, 's iad an dùil gu bheil fianais às leth "roghnachaidh nàdarra" a' dearbhadh aig an aon àm gun do dh'fhàs moileciuilean nam miocroban, a dh'fhàs an-uairsin nas casta tro ùine gu bhith nam meanbh-fhrìdean, nam magnòliathan, agus nam manaidsearan mòra marsantachd. Mar as trice thèid mean-fhàs (neo "èabhlaid") a chur an cèill ann an dòigh a chuireas ris a’ mhì-thuigsinn seo, oir cha dèanar soilleir e idir nach gabh cùisean a bhith mar seo fiù 's a rèir teòiric a’ mhean-fhàis fhèin; cha bhi roghnachadh nàdarra leis fhèin a' cruthachadh nìthean ùra.

Darwin na bhradaiche-litreachais? *
     'S e th' ann an roghnachadh nàdarra ach lèirsinn a tha so-thuigsinn agus sìmplidh gu leòr. Sgrìobh Edward Blyth (1810-1873) a bha na chruithiche, na cheimicear agus na ainmh-eòlaiche, mu dhèidhinn roghnachadh nàdarra ann an 1835-7. Bha sin ro Dharwin, a ghabh, a rèir coltais, an smaoin air iasad bho Bhlyth (1). Faodaidh feart oighreachail air choireigin a bhith aig fàs-bheairt a bhuileachas oirre, ann an àrainneachd àraidh, cothrom nas mò a ginean uile a thoirt seachad dhan ath ghinealach (an coimeas ri a co-chreutairean aig nach eil am feart ud). Thar nam bliadhnachan ri tighinn tha deagh chothrom ann gun sgapar am feart ud nas fharsainge a-measg na buidhne. Dh’fhaodadh an cothrom leasaichte a tha seo air sìolachadh (i.e. air clann a bhreith) tachairt ann an caochladh dhòighean:
- Cothrom nas fheàrr a bhith mairsinn beò. Tha an fhàs-bheairt "nas comasaich a-thaobh mairsinn beò". Is e seo as ciall dhan abairt “seasamh na feadhna as comasaiche", cuimhnich; chan eil comasachd corporra (san gnàth-sheagh) daonnan a' tighinn a-steach dhan chùis idir. Ma tha barrachd (neo nas lugha) coltais ann gum mair thu beò, tha aig a' cheart àm barrachd (neo nas lugha) coltais ann gum bi sliochd agad, agus mar sin gun tèid do ghinean a thoirt seachad. Mar eisimpleir, cuirear ginean airson gaoisid fhada ris an teans gum mair beathach beò ann an timcheallachd fhuair. Cuiridh ginean airson dath gheal ri breug-riochd mathain ann am fàsach shneachdaidh (chan ann a-mhàin a bhios breug-riochd na chuideachadh do bheathach gun a bhith air a glacadh ‘s air a h-itheadh; bithidh e na bhuannachd cuideachd do bheathaichean faghaideach ach an goid iad gun fhiosta air an cobhartaich). Mar sin, bhon a bhios mathan le dath nas bàine nas coltaiche mairsinn beò nuair a tha gort san tìr, tha e nas coltaiche gun tèid a dhath nas bàine a bhuileachadh air an ath ghinealach.
 - Cothrom nas fheàrr mairiste fhaighinn. Mas fheàrr leis a' mhòrchuid de iasg boireann de spìosas a bhith a’ cliathadh le mairistean aig a bheil earballan nas fhaide, bithidh teansa nas fheàrr ann, sa chumantas, aig èisg fhireann le ginean airson earballan nas fhaide a bhith a’ sìolachadh. Mar sin tha barrachd teansa ann gun tèid lebhreacan a dhèanamh de an cuid ghinean (ginean airson earballan fada am measg gach gine eile). Fàsaidh ginean airson earballan fada (agus mar sin èisg le earballan fada) nas cumanta sa bhuidheann ud.
- Dòigh sam bith eile gus sìolachadh a dhèanamh nas coltaiche. Smaoinich air spìosas de luibh, ‘s a sìol ga sgapadh leis a’ ghaoith. Ma bhios ginean aice a bheir air sìol na luibhe seo cruth a thoirt gu buil - cruth a ghabhas a thogail leis a’ ghaoith ann an dòigh a tha beagan nas soirbheachaile na cruth sìol luibhean eile - thèid na ginean airson a' chruth àraid seo (agus mar sin an cruth fhèin) air am fàbharachadh, 's e sin, air an "roghnachadh" san dòigh "nàdarra" seo.  Siod againn, ma-ta, bun-stèidh nam briathran "roghnachadh nàdarra".
     Air an làimh eile, ma thachras e gu bheil an spìosas de luibh a tha seo air eilean bheag, can, bithidh e nas coltaiche gun tèid sìol a shiubhlas astar fada "air chall aig muir". Mar sin, air an a tha eilean seo is iad ginean a nì cruth nach gabh a thogail cho furasta leis a’ ghaoith a bhios fàbharaichte. Ged aig aon àm ann an eachdraidh bha aig pòr na luibhe seo ginean a bhiodh freagarrach an dà chuid airson siubhal-adhair "astar-goirid" agus "astar-fada", dhèanadh èifeachd shìmplidh an roghnachaidh nàdarra seo cinnteach nach biodh air fhàgail air a cheann thall air an eilean ach luibhean aig am biodh sìol den t-seòrsa "astar-goirid". Bhiodh ginean airson sìl "astar-fada" air chall buileach.
Freagrachadh *
     Air a leithid de dhòigh bithidh creutairean a' fàs nas freagraiche (no nas cumte) ris a’ choimhearsnachd sa bheil iad. Can gu bheil aig buidheann de luibhean measgachadh de ghinean a riaghlas dè cho fada 's a bhios an cuid fhreumhan. Ma dh’fhuilingeas a' bhuidheann seo thairis air ginealaichean tràthan trice de shìde a tha glè thioram, is iad na luibhean aig a bheil freumhan nas fhaide a leigeas leo ruigsinn sìos dha na clàran uisge nas doimhne a mhaireas beò. Mar sin chan eil e cho coltach gun tèid na ginean airson freumhan nas giorra a thoirt seachad dhan ath ghinealach. Rè ùine cha bhi air fhàgail aig fear sam bith de na luibhean a tha seo ginean airson freumhan goirid, agus bithidh iad uile den t-seòrsa ‘fad-freumhach’. Tha iad a-nis air am freagrachadh nas fheàrr na bha an sinnsearan ri sìde thioram.

Creideamh Dharwin
     Chaidh am freagrachadh seo (‘s gun ann an ceart dha-rìribh ach na mhìn-tiùnadh dhan àrainneachd) air fhaicinn le Darwin mar phròsas a bha bun-chruthachail, agus cha mhòr gun chuibhreach. Na bheachd-san, ma b’urrainn do sheòrsachan ‘ùra’ èirigh ann an ùine ghoirid 's iad air fàs freagraichte ris an àrainneachd, b’urrainn mar an ceudna, ma bha ùine gu leòr ann, feartan ùra gun àireamh a nochdadh, fiùs creutairean a bhiodh uile gu lèir ùr. 'S ann mar seo, chreid e, a thàinig sgamhanan am bith ann an saoghal gun sgamhanan, agus itean ann an saoghal gun itean. Cha robh fios ceart aig Darwin ciamar a tha dualchas ag obair, ach bu chòir do dhaoine an là ‘n diugh a bhith nas glice na bha esan. Cha robh fios aige, mar eisimpleir, gur e a tha ga thoirt seachad ann an sìolachadh ach tòrr phasgain de fhiosrachadh (is e sin, ginean), neo sanasan codaichte.
    Cha ghabh cuideam gu leòr a chur air a' phuing nach bi roghnachadh nàdarra a' cur ri fiosrachadh. Is ann a gheibh e cuiteas dheth. Chan eil comas aige nì sam bi ùr a chruthachadh ann. San eisimpleir shuas mheudaich comas nan luibhean gus sìde thioram a sheasamh a-chionns gun deach ginean àraid a chall. Is e sin, chaill iad cuibhreann den fhiosrachadh a bha aig an sinnsirean. Is ann bho chian a bha am fiosrachadh airson freumhan fada aig na sinnsearan. Cha robh roghnachadh nàdarra as adhbhar do rud sam bith ùr gu bhith nochdadh am broinn na buidhne, no rud sam bith ùr gu bhith air a chur rithe.
    Is e daonnan a’ phrìs a phàighear an cois freagrachaidh, no speisealachaidh, call glan buan de chuid den fhiosrachadh sa bhuidheann ud de fhàs-bheairtean. Ma bha an àrainneachd a-nise air a h-atharrachadh air ais gu suidheachadh far nach maireadh beò ach luibhean le freumhan nas giorra, cha bhiodh am fiosrachadh airson freumhan goirid a' nochdadh a-rìst (mar gum biodh le "draoidheachd"). Cha bhiodh comas idir idir a-nis aig a’ bhuidheann freagrachadh a dhèanamh an taobh sin. Chan èireadh luibhean le freumhan goirid a-rìst gun cur a-steach as ùr bhon bhuidheann shinnsireil "ioma-mheasgaichte" san robh an dà ghnè ghinean an làthair.

Crìochan stèidhte atharrachaidh
     Am broinn a leithid de phròsas a chailleas fiosrachadh, tha e soilleir gum bidh crìochan stèidhte air farsaingeachd an atharrachaidh a ghabhas tachairt, bhon nach fhaod stòran-ghinean a bhith a’ sìor chall an cuid fiosrachaidh gu bràth tuilleadh.
     Tha seo ri fhaicinn ann an sìol-ghiullachd bheathaichean calla. Chan eil ann an seo ach eisimpleir eile de "roghnachadh". Chan eil a' chùis seo "nàdarra", oir tha làmh dhaoine an sàs sa ghnothaich - gidheadh tha an dearbh phrionnsabal ann. Gabh eich. A' tòiseachadh bho eich allaidh tha e air a bhith an comas dhaoine iomadach seòrsa each a thoirt gu buil le sìol-ghiullachd  - eich mhòr obrach, pònaidhean beaga bìodach, ‘s mar sin air adhart. Ach ann an ùine ghoirid ràinig an sìol-ghiullachd crìochan, do bhrìgh nach urrainn do roghnachadh a bhith ag obair ach air an fhiosrachadh ginteil a tha ann mar-thà. Dh'fhaodadh sìol-ghiullachd a bhith toirt gu buil seòrsachan each le bian geal, le bian donn agus mar sin air adhart, ach roghnachadh sìol-ghiullachd ann no às, cha chruthaichear eich le bian uaine - chan eil fiosrachadh a nì bian uaine a-measg each ann.
     Thig crìochan air cruth-atharrachadh am follais cuideachd a-chionns gum bi fiosrachadh ginteil nas lugha aig gach seòrsa ùr de each seach na bh'aig a shinnsearan "allta". Ìnnsidh toinisg dhuinn nach fhaodar tòiseachadh le pònaidhean beaga Sealtainneach agus roghnachadh sìol-ghiullachd a chleachdadh gus eich mhòr oibre den t-seòrsa "Dail Chluaidh" a ghintinn - chan eil am fiosrachadh ann tuilleadh! Mar as mò an speisealachadh (no am "freagrachadh" - sa chùis seo ri iarrtasan an duine a tha ris an t-sìol-ghiullachd, ‘s esan a’ riochdachadh na h-àrainneachd don each), sann as mò as urrainnear a bhith cinnteach gun deach an stòr-ghinean a "thanachadh" neo fhalmhachadh gu ìre mhòir. Agus sann as lugha de atharrachadh a ghabhas dèanamh bho seo a-mach mas ann leis an stoc seo a bhios sìol-ghiullachd ùr sam bith a' tòiseachadh.
    Tha e follaiseach bho na fìrinnean so-thuigsinn, loidigeach seo gu bheil roghnachadh nàdarra fada air falbh bhon phròsas cruthachail, àrd-streapach, neo-chrìochnach ud a bha ann am mac-meanmna Dharwin (agus mòran neo-eòlaichean an là ‘n diugh, ‘s iad fo bhuaidh fòghlaim lapaich).
   Tha làn-fhios aig teoiricearan èabhlaideach air seo, gun teagamh. Tha fios aca gum feum iad an cuid earbsa a chur ann an seòl air choireigin eile gus am fiosrachadh ùr a tha dhìth orra a thoirt gu buil, a chionns gu bheil e aig cridhe stòiridh a’ mhean-fhàis. "Bha siod ann reimhid", mar a tha an sgeul, "uair dheth robh saoghal" bha creutairean beò gun sgamhanan. An uairsin, ann an dòigh air choireigin dh’èirich fiosrachadh ginteil a rinn sgamhanan. Ach cha robh itean ri lorg san t-saoghail. An ceann ùine dh’èirich iadsan seo cuideachd. Ach se cnag na cùise nach eil e an comas roghnachaidh nàdarra, leis fhèin, cruthachadh a dhèanamh. Se pròsas ‘tearbaidh’, no taghadh eadar caochladh nithean a dh’fheumas a bhith am bith bho thùs.

Ciamar am bi èabhlaidich a’ mìneachadh fiosrachaidh ùir?

     Bhon nach urrainn do roghnachadh nàdarra ach tearbadh a-mhàin a dhèanamh, tha teoiricearan èabhlaideach an là ‘n diugh an eisimeil air mùthaidhean (mearachdan lebhreacaidh air thuaiream sa phròsas gintinn) mar inneal a chruthaicheas an stuth amh air am bi roghnachadh nàdarra an uairsin ag obair. Ach se deasbad eadar-dhealaichte tha sin. Tha dearbhadh math ann nach bi  mùthaidhean a chaidh a sgrùdadh a’ cur ri fiosrachadh, agus gu bheil duilgheadasan mòra teoiriceach aig mùthadh mar mheadhan sa cheangal seo (2) . Tha fear de na h-eòlaichean-fiosrachaidh as comasaiche san t-saoghail, Dr Werner Gitt bhon Institiud Fheadarail Nàdar-Fheallsanachd is Teicneolais ann am Braunschweig, air a ràdh ‘Chan eil lagh nàdarra ann air a bheil sinn eòlach tron a bhios fiosrachadh ag èiridh bho dhamhnadh , cha mhò a tha pròsas fiosaigeach neo foir-iongantas damhnail ann air a bheil sinn eòlach as urrainn seo a dhèanamh (3) .’ Dh'fhoillsich e dùlan gus an ràiteas seo a bhreugnachadh gu saidheansail. Cha deach a fhreagairt fhathast. Chìthear gu bheil eadhon na mùthaidhean ud a tha nam buannachd a-thaobh mairsinn beò nan call a-thaobh fiosrachaidh. Cha bhi iad a’ cruthachadh an stutha ùir riatanaich ud air an tèid roghnachadh nàdarra an-uairsin an sàs (4).

Geàrr-chunntas:
     a) Cha bhi roghnachadh nàdarra a' cur ri fiosrachadh. Gu dearbh, nì e lùghdachadh ann.
     b) Tha seòl a dhìth air mean-fhàs gus fiosrachadh ùr a thoirt am bith.
     c) Feumaidh èabhlaidich cobhair iarraidh air mùthaidhean (mearachdan lebhreacaidh ginteil) a mhìneachadh ciamar a dh’èireas fiosrachadh ùr mus ‘stiùir’ rognachadh nàdarra an pròsas mean-fhàsail, mas fhìor.
     d) Gu ruige seo, tha gach sgrùdadh air mùthaidhean a’ sealltainn, a-rèir coltais, call fiosrachaidh. Chan eil seo na iongantas le pròsas tuairmseach.
     e) Mar sin, chan eil e reusanta idir a bhith cleachdadh eisimpleirean de roghnachadh nàdarra (a lùghdaicheas am fiosrachadh ann am buidhnean beò) mar eisimpleirean de "èabhlaid a’ tachairt".
     f) Tha roghnachadh nàdarra, ag obair air an fhiosrachadh cruthaichte a bha an làthair sna stòran-ghinean tùsail, gu math ciallach ann an saoghal leagte . Is urrainn dha mion-sgioblachadh a dhèanamh air an dòigh a fhreagras fàs-bheairtean rin àrainneachd. Is urrainn dha cuideachd a bhith na dhìon an aghaidh dol à bith ann an saoghal mallaichte a tha ri uchd a’ bhàis. Tro bhi "sgàradh" stòr-ghinean mòra gu bhith nam buidhnean nas lùgha, faodaidh e cur ris an eugsamhlachd a chìthear a-measg sliochd an tùs-ghnè , dìreach mar a gheibhear anns na caochla sheòrsa each a dh'èirich bhon aon ghnè. Thig fiù ‘spìosasan’ ùra am bith mar sin, ach cha tig fiosrachadh ùr. Tha seo na chuideachadh ann a bhith a’ mìneachadh na h-eugsamhlachd nas mò a th’againn an diugh seach na bha ann air bòrd an Àirce.
     Is dòcha ma bha dha-rìribh fianais dheimhinn ann de phròsas chruthachail aig fìor-chreidmhich san èabhlaid, cha leigeadh iad a leas a bhith a’ ruaimleachadh nan uisgeachan cho tric le bhi cur air adhart pròsas a chromas "le bruthach" (se sin roghnachadh nàdarra) mar gum biodh seo a' daingneachadh an cuid chreidimh sa phròsas-streapaidh "ri bruthach" thar chàich - se sin mean-fhàs bho mhoileciulan gu mac-an-duine.
    Feumaidh sinn fios a leigeil dhan t-saoghal seo, saoghal a tha sìor-fhàs nas fhoghlaimte, ciamar a bhios na fìrinnean mu atharrachadh bith-eòlach a’ buntainn ri fìor eachdraidh an t-saoghail bhon Bhìoball, gus cobhair a thoirt do dhaoine gu bhith a’ tuigsinn agus a’ creidsinn teachdaireachd an t-Soisgeil, 's e stèidhichte gu daingeann air an fhìor-eachdraidh a tha seo.

Iomraidhean
1. Taylor, I., In the Minds of Men, TFE Publishing, Toronto, Canada, tt-dd 125-133, 1984. (Till)
2. From a Frog to a Prince, bhideo, riochdaichte le Keziah, sgaoilte le Answers in Genesis. Faic cuideachd Spetner, L.S., Not by Chance!, The Judaica Press Inc., New York, 1998. (Till)
3. Gitt, W., In the Beginning was Information, Christliche Literatur-Verbreitung, a’ Ghearmailt, t-d 79, 1997.(Till)
4. Wieland, C., Beetle bloopers, Creation 19(3):30, 1997;<www.answersingenesis.org/docs/241.asp>.

(Gheibhear an t-aiste seo cuideachd ann am Pòlainnis an seo: Mętne wody, agus ann an Greugais an seo: ΞΕΚΑΘΑΡΙΖΟΝΤΑΣ ΤΗ ΣΥΓΧΥΣΗ ΓΙΑ ΤΗ ΦΥΣΙΚΗ ΕΠΙΛΟΓΗ)

BEAG-FHACLAIR 
roghnachadh nàdarra - natural selection
seasamh na feadhna as comasaiche - survival of the fittest
sìolachadh na feadhna as comasaiche - reproduction of the fittest
meanbh-fhrìdean - insects
magnòliathan - magnolias
mean-fhàs - evolution
èabhlaid - evolution
bradaiche-litreachais - plagiarist
cruithiche - creationist
ainmh-eòlaiche - zoologist
feart oighreachail - inheritable trait
fàs-bheairt - organism
ginean - genes
breug-riochd - camouflage
faghaideach - predatory
mairiste - mate/mating
spìosas - species
freagrachadh - adaptation
mìn-ghleusadh/mìn-tiùnadh - fine-tuning
 pròsas - process
bun-chruthachail - essentially creative
gun chuibhreach - without limits
dualchas - heredity
sanasan codaichte - coded instructions
sìol-ghiullachd - breeding
beathaichean calla - domestic animals
ginteil - genetic
neo-eòlaichean - lay-people
teòiricearan - theoreticians
èabhlaideach - evolutionist
tearbadh - culling/separation
mùthaidhean - mutations
Nàdar-fheallsanachd - physics
damhnadh - matter (out of which anything is formed - Dwelly)
foir-iongantas damhnail - material phenomenon
leagte - fallen
tùs-ghnè - original kind

jeudi, juin 28, 2012

Calvinism, the State, and Freedom of Conscience

Calvinism, the State, and Freedom of Conscience (1)

H. Henry MEETER
(Excerpt from "The Basic Ideas of Calvinism" by H. Henry Meeter, Th.D., Baker Book House, Grand Rapids, Michigan,1973) -

"A privilege of a very different order which the State must guarantee the citizen relates to his spiritual existence. Just as the State must provide conditions which will tend to promote his material well-being and enable him to earn a decent living, so the State must promote his spiritual freedom - freedom for man's soul. This will include free speech, a free press, freedom of religion, in a word, freedom of conscience. This is a cause of which the historic Calvinist is an ardent defender. Calvinists in history have not always consistently practised this principle in granting liberty of conscience to others; nevertheless, freedom of conscience follows directly from the principles of Calvinism and must strenuously be maintained as a right which the State must grant its citizens. Liberty of conscience may be defined as the boundary line of the State's authority in the realm of the spirit. 
(p 149)

"Freedom of conscience and, hence, freedom of religion should be guaranteed to all citizens, also to unbelievers. No one should be molested by the State because of his religious convictions unless the authority of the State in its own proper sphere is transgressed. Calvinism, from the time of Calvin on, has made much of the freedom of conscience. Calvin also fought a battle for years at Geneva for the complete separation of Church and State, though he never achieved his goal. This in time would have led to freedom of religion as its logical outcome. It is true, later Calvinists, in Holland, Scotland, and the New England States reverted to a form of State-church. Their action might conceivably be defended on the practical ground that that the Protestant religion would have gone down in defeat in those turbulent days of the religious wars had not the States taken upon themselves the defense of the Protestant faith. But the establishment of a State-church was, nevertheless, a departure from Calvinism as propounded by Calvin. Roman Catholics, Lutherans and Arminians defended the State-church idea as a matter of principle. Not so the Calvinists. Philip Schaff states that in that darkest chapter of Church history the Calvinists were less intolerant than men of other faiths; but they were all intolerant. It is true that freedom of conscience as it manifested itself in the right of free speech was granted to Roman Catholics, Lutherans, and even men of antithetical philosophical opinions as Spinoza in Holland, a privilege which was denied in countries dominated by other faiths; but the right to gather for religious worship and the right of franchise was at times denied by the Calvinists. However, we can thankfully record that it is a principle inherent in Calvinism and today commonly applied, that all churches and all religious societies, and all citizens, irrespective of their views regarding eternal matters, shall be treated on a basis of equality by the State. Religious toleration granted to other than State churches, as exemplified in the constitutions of Italy, Denmark, and the Scandinavian countries is not identical with complete religious liberty. The Calvinist stands for complete religious liberty to all and religious equality before the State." 
(pp171-172)
_____________________________________

Calvinism, the State, and Freedom of Conscience (2)

(Excerpt from "An Introduction to Christian Philosophy" by JM Spier, Craig Press, Nutley, New Jersey, 1976. Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing Company) -

     If the Netherlands decided as a state to force all citizens to become protestants, then all protestants should abhor such an action, as it would exceed the authority that God has given to the state....
     The destination-function of the State is juridical. A State is qualified as a juridical relationship. Law (justice) and power are the two roles in the structure of the State...
     Dooyeweerd defines the juridical function of the state as follows: The internal law of the state is the law which a government enforces in a particular territory; it is the law of a sovereign state. And it is based on the organization of the armed forces governing a territory...
     The nuclear moment of the juridical aspect is judgment, the well-balanced harmonization of a multiplicity of interests. The public law of a state ought to be the well-balanced harmonization of all the interests within a particular territory. No single interest within the borders of a state can be ignored.
     The legal community of the state has its own universality, a universal relationship of law, which in a certain sense encompasses all other societal relationships. We are not making any concessions to universalism, as the state only spans other relationships in public law. Other relationships are not merely subordinate parts of the state. The state does not have a voice in the internal law of the family, school, church, science, or industry. Other relationships are entitled to the protection of the state. The state is called to protect their interests against any encroachment, thus enabling them to develop in peace (cf. 1 Tim 2:2 "that we may lead a tranquil and quiet life in all godliness and gravity")...
     Many deny the possibility of a Christian state, either because
1. they think that faith is the exclusive property of the church, as an institution, or
2. they are convinced that a Christian state would only be possible if all its citizens were Christians and this ideal can never be realized.
3. Others accept the idea of a Christian state, and see its possibility in a specific relation in which the state supports a church or an ecclesiastical confession. The Roman Catholic view, for example, believes that in spiritual matters the State must accept the pronouncements of the church and exercise its authority to promote the church's welfare.
     This same sentiment is expressed by those who would have the state accept a certain confession to which its office-bearers must subscribe.
     None of these solutions are satisfactory. The first denies that the structure of the state is expressed in the sphere of faith, thus shutting off its individuality in the ethical sphere. The second also believes that the state lacks an internal pistical [faith] function but it seeks to compensate for this by externally binding the state to the church. This view commits the error of denying a real Christian character to the state as such.
     Now we do not deny that the state can sustain external ties with churches within its territory, but such bands must not infringe upon the sovereignty of the church or of the state.
     Every created thing, including the state, functions in all modalities. The structure of the state has indeed a typical pistical function too. Not only the Christian state, but the non-Christian as well, functions in the modality of faith. Unbelief does not signify a lack of a function of faith. Unbelief is only the wrong employment of faith. It seeks its final certainty in a lie rather than in the truth. Every state functions in the modality of faith and is either Christian or non-Christian.
     The destination-function of the state is juridical and not pistical. Even in a land in which there was an ideal Christian state, the state would not be identical with the church. The church is a pistical and the state is a juridical relationship....
     Dooyeweerd calls Divine Revelation in the state the political norm of faith, because each state is subject to it, and ought to confess the sovereignty of God. The state ought to make this confession, but in a different way from the church...The confession of the state ought to be a political confession. No matter what the personal faith of its members is, a Christian state ought publicly to confess - for example in the opening words of laws or in proclamations or on solemn occasions - the sovereignty of God and recognize Christ as the Ruler of the kings of the earth.
     A neutral state is a fiction. A non-Christian state also makes a confession. But it closes its eyes to the light of the Word of God and no longer correctly understands the general revelation of God in the life of the state. Consequently, the political norm of faith, the political principle of revelation forces the people and their rulers to bow before the idols of law and power. The life of the state is pushed in an apostate direction, and a political confession is made in the sovereignty of the people, or in the omnipotence of the state, or in what other gods there may be....
     Finally we must note two things. First, a Christian state is only possible if the idea of it is rooted in public opinion.To form a basis of power for a government which can actualize Christian political principles, the idea of a Christian state must be deeply embedded in the life of the people.
Secondly, it is correct to say that the state arises from common grace, since it exists because of sin, and since even an apostate state displays the structure of a state in every respect. But common grace, through which God maintains the temporal world order and checks the power of sin, is rooted in special grace, rooted in Him who gives life to the world. Life may never be divided into two spheres. Both common and special grace permeate all of life, which is renewed and maintained by Christ." (pp 220-228)

Dooyeweerd: Hellenistic origins of 'body-soul' dichotomy

"Thermae Boxer" c 330 BC (Photo Wiki)
Herman Dooyeweerd on the Hellenistic origins of the 'body-soul' dichotomy.

(Excerpt from chapter "Philosophy and Theology III" of "In the Twilight of Western Thought")

     The Thomistic view of human nature as a composite of an immortal, rational soul and a perishable material body united as form and matter as one substance, had no more in common with the biblical revelation about man than the Cartesian conception. Both of them were metaphysical theories ruled by un-biblical religious basic motives.
     The whole idea that a philosophical knowledge of human nature would be possible by the natural light of human reason alone, i.e., independent of religious presuppositions, testified to a fundamental apostasy from the biblical starting-point. And the very fact that scholastic theology sought to corroborate the Thomistic-Aristotelian view by texts of the Scripture showed how much theological exegesis itself had come into the grip of un-biblical basic motives.
     Let us consider this situation a little more in detail. The nature-grace motive did not enter Christian thought before the end of the 12th century, during the renaissance of the Aristotelian philosophy. It aimed originally at a religious compromise between the Aristotelian view of nature and the ecclesiastical doctrine of fall into sin, and redemption by Jesus Christ.
     The Aristotelian view of nature was no more independent of religious presuppositions than any other philosophical view. It was completely ruled by the dualistic religious basic motive of Greek thought, namely, that of form and matter. Though this terminological denomination is of Aristotelian origin, the central motive designed by it was by no means of Aristotelian invention.
     It originated from the meeting between two antagonistic Greek religions, namely, the older nature religion of life and death, and the younger cultural religion of the Olympian gods. Nietzsche and his friend Rhode, were the first to discover the conflict between these religions in the Greek tragedies. Nietzsche spoke of the contest between the Dionysian and the Apollonian spirit in these tragedies. But in fact here was at issue a conflict in the religious basic motive of the whole Greek life and thought.
     The pre-Olympian religion of life and death deified the ever-flowing stream of organic life which originates from mother earth and cannot be fixed or restricted by any corporeal form. It is from this formless stream of life that, in the order of time, the generations of beings separate themselves and appear in an individual bodily shape. The corporeal form can only be maintained at the cost of other living beings, so that the life of the one is the death of the other. So there is an injustice in any fixed form of life which for this reason must be repaid to the horrible fate of death, designated by the Greek terms anangkè and heimarmenè tuché . This is the meaning of the mysterious words of the Ionian philosopher of nature, Anaximander: "The divine origin of all things is the apeiron (i.e., that which lacks restricting form). The things return to that from which they originate in conformity to the law of justice. For they pay to each other penalty and retribution for their injustice in the order of time."
Here the central motive of the archaic religion of life and death has found a clear expression in Anaximander's philosophical view of physis, or nature. It is the motive of the formless stream of life, ever-flowing throughout the process of becoming and passing away, and pertaining to all perishable things which are born in a corporeal form, and subjected to anangké. This is the original sense of the Greek matter-motive. It originated from a deification of the biotic aspect of our temporal horizon of experience and found its most spectacular expression in the cult of Dionysius, imported from Thrace.
The religious form-motive, on the other hand, is the central motive of the younger Olympian religion, the religion of form, measure and harmony, wherein the cultural aspect of the Greek polis was deified. It found its most pregnant expression in the Delphian Apollo, the legislator. The Olympian gods are personified cultural powers. They have left mother earth with its ever-flowing stream of life and its ever-threatening fate of death, and have acquired the Olympus as their residence. They have a divine and immortal, personal form, invisible to the eye of sense, an ideal form of splendid beauty, the genuine prototype of the Platonic notion of of the metaphysical eidos, or idea. But these immortal gods had no power over the anangké, the fate of death of mortals. That is why the new religion was only accepted as the public religion of the Greek polis. But in their private life the Greek people held to the the old formless deities of life and death, doubtless more crude and incalculable than the Olympians, but more efficient as to the existential needs of man.
     Thus the Greek form-matter motive gave expression to a fundamental dualism in the Greek religious consciousness. As the central starting-point of Greek philosophy, it was not dependent upon the mythical forms and representations of the popular belief. By claiming autonomy over against the latter, Greek philosophy certainly did not mean to break with the dualistic basic motive of the Greek religious consciousness. Much rather this motive was the common starting-point of the different philosophical tendencies and schools. But because of its intrinsically dualistic character, it drove Greek philosophical thought into polarly opposed directions. Since a real synthesis between the opposite motives of form and matter was not possible, there remained no other recourse than that of attributing the religious primacy to one of them with the result that the other was depreciated. Whereas in the Ionian nature-philosophy the formless and ever-flowing stream of life was deified, the Aristotelian god is conceived as pure form and the matter-principle is depreciated in the Aristotelian metaphysics as the principle of imperfection.
     In the state of apostasy the religious impulse, innate in the human heart, turns away from the living God and is directed towards the temporal horizon of modal aspects. This gives rise to the formation of idols originating in the deification of one of these aspects, i.e., in absolutizing what is only relative. But what is relative can only reveal its meaning in coherence with its correlates. This means that the absolutization of one aspect of our temporal world calls forth, with an inner necessity, correlates of this aspect which now, in the religious consciousness, claim an opposite absoluteness. In other words, every idol gives rise to a counter-idol.
     Thus in the Greek religious consciousness the form-motive was bound to the matter-motive as its counterpart. The inner dualism caused in the central starting-point of Greek thought by these two opposite motives gave rise to the dichotomistic view of human nature as a composite of a perishable material body and an immortal, rational soul. It should be noticed that this view originated in the Orphic religious movement. This movement had made the Dionysian religion of life and death into the infra-structure of a higher religion of the celestial sphere, i.e., the starry sky, and interpreted the Olympian religion in this naturalistic sense. In consequence the central motive of form, measure and harmony was now transferred to the supra-terrestrial sphere of the starry sky. Man was supposed to have a double origin. His rational soul corresponding to the perfect form and harmony of the starry sphere originates in the latter, but his material body originates from the dark and imperfect sphere of mother earth, with its ever-flowing stream of life and its anangkē, its inescapable fate of death. As long as the immortal rational soul is bound to the terrestrial sphere it is obliged to accept a material body as its prison and grave and it must transmigrate from body to body in the everlasting process of becoming, decline, and rebirth.
     It is only by means of an ascetic life that the rational soul can purify itself from the contamination with the material body, so that at the end of a long period it may return to its proper home, the celestial sphere of form, measure and harmony.
     The great influence of this dualistic Orphic view of human nature upon the Pythagorean school, Empedocles, Parmenides, and Plato, is generally known. Since Parmenides, the founder of Greek metaphysics, this dichotomistic view was combined with the metaphysical opposition between the realm of eternal being, presenting itself in the the ideal spherical form of the heaven, and the phenomenal terrestrial world of coming to be and passing away, subjected to the anangkē. Plato purified his metaphysics from Parmenides' naturalistic conception of form, and he conceived the eternal forms of being as eide, or ideas, respectively. In Plato's dialogue,Phaedo, the proof of the immortality of the rational soul is consequently unbreakably bound to the metaphysical doctrine of the eternal ideas as the ideal forms of being. The latter are sharply opposed to the visible world, subjected as it is to the matter-principle of becoming and decay. It was supposed that the metaphysical forms of being are only accessible to logico-theoretical thought, viewed as the center of the immortal soul. The logical function of theoretical thought was considered to be completely independent of the material body since it is directed upon the eternal forms of being and must consequently be of the same nature as these imperishable forms. Henceforth the thesis that the logical function of the theoretical act of thought is independent of the material body became a steady argument in the metaphysical proof of the immortality of the rational soul.
     But this argument originated in an absolutization of the antithetical relation which is characteristic of the theoretical attitude of thought. We have seen that in this theoretical attitude the logical aspect of our thought is opposed to the non-logical aspects of experience in order to make the latter accessible to a conceptual analysis. In this way we can make the non-logical aspects of our body into the object of our logico-theoretical enquiry. But we have also established that this anti-thetical relation between the logical and the non-logical aspects of our temporal experiential horizon does not correspond to reality. It is only the result of a theoretical abstraction of our logical aspect of thought from its unbreakable bond of coherence with all the other aspects of our experience.
     Under the influence of the dualistic religious form-matter motive, however, Greek metaphysics ascribed to this merely theoretical opposition a metaphysical significance, to the effect that the logico-theoretical function of thought was viewed as an independent substance. In this way there arose the idol of the immortal and rational human soul which was identified with the logical function of our act of theoretical thought. In Plato's dialogue,Phaedo, this identification is clearly proclaimed. But it should be noticed that it dated from the first appearance in Greek philosophy of the metaphysical opposition between the eternal form of being and the material world of coming into being and passing away. It was the founder of Greek metaphysics, Parmenides, who was the first to identify theoretical thought with eternal being. In a later phase of his thought, Plato replaced his original view of the simplicity of the human soul by the conception that this soul is composed of two mortal material parts and an immortal spiritual one; nevertheless, he maintained the identification of the latter with the logico-theoretical function of thought. According to him, the latter is the pure form of the soul, viewed apart from its incarnation in the impure material body.
     Aristotle, who initially completely accepted both Plato's doctrine of ideas and his dualistic view of soul and body, tried later on to overcome this dualism. He abandoned the Platonic separation between the world of the ideal forms and the visible world of perishable material things. He made the ideal forms into the immanent principles of being in the perishable substances, which are according to him composed of matter and form. He sought to overcome the central conflict between the matter-motive and the form-motive in the Greek religious consciousness, by reducing it to the complementary relation of a material and a form given to it, in the sense in which this relation is found in the cultural aspect of experience. As the principle of coming into being and passing away, matter has, according to him, no actual but only potential being. It is only by a substantial form that it can have actual existence. Form and matter are united in the natural things to one natural substance, and this natural substance would be the absolute reference point of all properties we ascribe to the thing.
This metaphysical view was also applied to man as natural substance. Thus the rational soul was conceived as the substantial form of the perishable material body. Since, however, the soul is only the substantial form of the body without being itself a substance, it cannot exist apart from the material body and lacks, in consequence, immortality. What, according to Aristotle, is really an immortal substance is only the active theoretical intellect which, in his opinion, does not stem from human nature, but comes from the outside into the soul. This active theoretical thought, however, lacks any individuality, since individuality stems from matter, and active theoretical thought remains completely separated from the material body. It is the pure and actual form of thinking, and, as such, it has a general character.
     Here the fundamental dualism in the form-matter motive, which at first sight seemed to be overcome by Aristotle, clearly reappears. In fact, it could not be overcome since it ruled the central starting-point of Greek theoretical thought.
     Thomas Aquinas tried to accommodate the Aristotelean view of human nature to the doctrine of the Church. First he adapted it to the doctrine of divine creation, which, as such, was incompatible with the Greek form-matter motive. According to Thomas, God created man as a natural substance composed of matter and form. Second, he interpreted the Aristotelean view in such a way that the rational soul was conceived of both as the form of the material body and as an immortal substance which can exist apart from the body. He accepted the Aristotelean view that matter is the principle of individuation and that form as such lacks individuality. The Aristotelean view that the active theoretical intellect does not originate from the natural process of development, but comes from the outside, was interpreted in a so-called psycho-creationist sense. God creates every immortal rational soul apart. But the result of this scholastic accommodation was a complex of insoluble contradictions.
In the first place, the psycho-creationist doctrine contradicts the emphatic biblical statement (Genesis 2:2), that God had finished all his works of creation. Thus a whole complex of theological pseudo-problems was introduced. If God continues to create rational souls after the fall of man, does he create sinful souls, or should we assume that sin does only originate from the material body? The traditional solution of this problem to the effect that God creates souls deprived of the original state of communion with him, but not sinful in themselves, is unbiblical to such a degree that it does not need any further argumentation. For what else is the fall into sin than breaking the communion with God, i.e., what else than the state of apostasy from Him? Secondly, if the immortal soul is individualized only by the material body, how can it retain its individuality after its separation from the body?
     I shall not go into a more detailed discussion of these scholastic problems. The vitium originis of this psycho-creationist theory is its un-biblical starting-point, which cannot be made innocuous by any scholastic accommodation to the Church's doctrine and by an appeal to texts of Scripture. For the theological exegesis of these texts is in this case itself infected by this un-biblical starting-point. It lacks the key of knowledge which alone can open to us the radical sense of the divine Word-revelation. For, let me end with words of Calvin in the beginning of the first chapter of his Institutio Religionis Christianae, "The true knowledge of ourselves is dependent upon the true knowledge of God."

(Herman Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight of Western Thought , The Craig Press, Nutley, New Jersey, 1968, pp 162-172)

NB New edition of In the Twilight of Western Thought (published by Paideia Press, 2012).

See also opening chapters of (new edition of) Dooyeweerd's Roots of Western Culture: Pagan, Secular, and Christian Options (published by Paideia Press, 2012).
________________
For FREE PDF DOWNLOADS of these and many other Dooyeweerd books go to homepage -

Europa's Repressed Id?: "The Celtic Consciousness"

     (Chaidh an lèirmheas-leabhair seo a sgrìobhadh air ais ann an 1983 (airson na h-iris "Cencrastus"). Ghabh mi cothrom a leudachadh beagan an seo. Tha mi 'n dùil gum bi an leabhar tomadach seo a-mach à clò a-nis, ach gun teagamh tha na cinn-chonnspaid a chaidh an togail san lèirmheas cudromach fhathast. Tha fhios nach e ionnsaigh pearsanta air duine sam bith a th'anns an sgrùdadh-leabhair seo, ach oidhirp air cùisean cànanach is cultarach a shoilleireachadh.  - F MacFh., An Giblean 2004)

Tara Brooch AD 700
EUROPA'S REPRESSED ID? 
Fearghas MacFhionnlaigh (1983)
 _________________________________________________
 
Robert O'Driscoll (ed.), The Celtic Consciousness, Canongate Publishing, 642pp, £32.00, 1983

"For too long we have been taught that the history of Britain began with the coming of the Romans who brought with them a novel series of blessings to tribes of blue-painted savages, as wild as any Captain Cook may have encountered. Roman Britain has been depicted as a country populated, not by Britons, but by Romans, with a few gangs of British slaves for their convenience. These were, we were told, then wiped out or pushed into the mountainous periphery of our island by the coming of the Anglo-Saxons. We now know that all these pictures are false."
- An excerpt from the essay entitled 'Material Culture, Myth and Folk Memory' by Anne Ross (Dept. of Archaeology, Univ. of Southampton, and School of Scottish Studies, Edin.), one of fifty-five contributions to this hefty well-illustrated volume which were originally delivered as papers at a symposium on Celtic Consciousness in Toronto in 1978. 

     The Celtic Consciousness. The title disquieted me for some reason. However, glancing at the list of contributors I relaxed a bit. Here, among many others, were Richard Demarco, Liam De Paor, Owen Dudley Edwards, Hamish Henderson, Thomas Kinsella, Proinsias MacCana, John Maclnnes, Sorley Maclean, John MacQueen, Seán Ó Tuama, Conor Cruise O'Brien. (I think the presence of that last name alone was sufficient to settle me - no Twilight Romantic he!) And if the name of one Salvador Dali happened also to appear, his submission turned out to be brief, and what pleased me even more, in French! In the event, I found most of the writers informative and authoritative, though periodically my initial misgivings re-surfaced until, by the time I finished the book, my unease had become anger.
     The book is ambitious, as the title suggests, attempting to project before us Celtic history from its beginnings to the present, dealing with archaeology, language, myth, folklore, art, literature, music, politics, etc. The editor, Robert O'Driscoll (Artistic Director, Celtic Arts Canada, and Director of the Celtic Studies Programme, Univ. of Toronto), acknowledged a pronounced bias towards Ireland and Scotland in this book, and plans to redress the balance in favour of the P-Celts in a subsequent volume. Clearly a short review cannot do justice to a 'cast' of fifty-five, and a few selected 'clips' must suffice to introduce to us some of the many subplots which combine to bear this epic forward:

The sum of the evidence', writes Jan Filip (Univ. of Prague)...
justifies the view that the region where the historical Celtic culture crystallized was in the north-west of the Alps, and covered the territory from north-eastern France, across southern Germany, into Bohemia. There is hardly a nation in Europe which has not drawn directly or indirectly on the wealth of this Celtic heritage.
     As to language, Heinrich Wagner (Professor at the Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies) argues that "Insular Celtic . . . provides a striking link between the languages of Western Europe and those of Northern Africa and the Middle East (Berber, Egyptian, Arabic and Hebrew)" while Elmar Temes (Univ. of Hamburg) in a fascinating study of the grammatical structure of the Celtic tongues contrasts for us the 'word' in German which, 'in whatever phonetic context it may appear, does not change at all', with the Celtic word - 
There is hardly a language in the world for which the traditional concept of "word" is so doubtful as for the Celtic languages . . . We may say that the word in Celtic is like a chameleon, which changes its appearance according to its surroundings.
     In his article on Celtic art Liam De Paor (Univ. College Dublin) tells us -
It seems that the weapons of the Republic, with which Rome was to conquer the Mediterranean world, were largely based on Celtic prototypes. It was neither technology nor innate superiority but organisation that gave the Romans the edge. 
He also recounts how, when the Celts were asked by a general of Alexander the Great what they feared most, they answered that they feared nothing - except that the sky might fall on them. 
     Now surely too we have a poignant glimpse of the Celtic Consciousness in De Paor's observation that -
The most dedicated and superb craftsmanship in the Tara Brooch is in the ornamentation of the reverse, which would have lain against the wool of the wearer's cloak; the richest metalwork and settings of the Ardagh Chalice are on the underside of the foot: there is a conspicuous absence in this art of bourgeois calculation.
     As suggested already, one of the positive attributes of the book is the eschewal by most writers of any hint of celtomania. Kevin Danaher (Univ. College Dublin) asks  
'if we are not straining the bounds of scientific credibility by claiming that the (modern) Irish are a Celtic people'.  
Owen Dudley Edwards observes that -
The word "Celtic" is in many ways very misleading for Scotland'.  
And Richard Demarco, as he discusses the work of Joseph Beuys, Tadeusz Kantor, Dennis Leon and Paul Neagu, concedes that -
none of these artists are strictly Celtic...
 However, other writers define the term 'Celtic' in a hazier way, e.g. Larkin Kerwin - 'A Note on the Celtic Contribution to Science' - for whom Irish or Scots birth is qualification enough, and William lrwin Thompson in his 'The Mythic Past and the Present Moment - 
Although I am an American and am centuries removed from the Celtic homelands, I was raised in an affirmation of the Celtic Consciousness.
     Again, we can (thankfully) contrast the sybilline doom-saying of Maire Cruise O'Brien concerning the future viability of the Irish language -
"I am anxious to emphasise the gloomy viewpoint . . . because the view from this point coincides in large measure with the truth . . death throes ... last flowering..."
with the more inspirational agnosticism of John Maclnnes, as he tests the pulse of that language's Scottish sister -
"It would be wrong to imagine ... that we can predict the future with confident pessimism ... Whatever the future may hold, it seems appropriate, reviewing the culture of Gaelic Scotland over fifteen hundred years, to assert Nec tamen consumebatur."
     Certain strands of the book made me weary, like interpretations of the ancient Celts which make them just too neatly relevant to our decade - for example they are hailed as a feminist antidote to the macho Classical Renaissance-
"Celtic art represents 'psyche', the intuitive female principle, as opposed to what Renaissance art has come to represent in the twentieth century, 'techne', the mere mechanical application of outworn rules of proportion, a harsh linear male principle." (Richard Demarco: 'Celtic Vision in Contemporary Art'.) 
     This 'female principle' undergoes apotheosis in Demarco's rhetoric (becoming 'Earth Spirit' etc), but others who use such incantatory phraseology are apparently (and alarmingly) in earnest -  
"The quality of (Celtic) life was enriched by communion with the Goddess, a feminine spirit who dwelt in the rivers, lochs, and hilltops ... we can renew those links with our primeval mother, and treat her as the Earth Goddess she is..." (Marianna Lines, Findhorn)
      And - 
"The return of animism in communities like Findhorn is thus a fascinating experiment in the best Celtic tradition." (William Irwin Thompson, Founding Director of the Lindisfarne Assoc.)
     This brings me to my main argument with the book. A mysticism seeps up through it, undermining the less fanciful writers and leaving them like boulders in a bog. The source of this subterranean spring is, I fear, the book's Editor with his espousal of W.B. Yeats and George Russell (AE) as the 'mediums' of Celtic Consciousness. They were the 'spiritual leaders of the Celtic Renaissance' , he informs us 
In exploring the ideals of the Revival I shall illustrate my arguments now from one writer, now from the other' (p 402). 
Marsh-gas begins to sting my nostrils. These two gentlemen, I hardly need to remind anyone, were writers of English. Crucial questions immediately pose themselves - questions with which the book deals either inadequately or not at all. Can that which is not dead be revived? Can the burgeoning of English and the decay of Irish be described as a 'Celtic Renaissance'? Just what is the connection between consciousness and language?  Indeed, when is a Celt not a Celt? Are not the contemporary speakers of the Celtic tongues, with their consciousness of decisive military defeat, of prolonged cultural decline, of unchronicled or deliberately distorted histories, of depressed peripheral economies, of impending linguistic extinction, are not they and their poets, rather than anglophone romantics, the authentic voices of Celtic Consciousness? The editor seemingly thinks not. Compared with innumerable pages devoted to Yeats, 'AE' and Synge, the analysis of current Celtic-language literature is minimal. As conceded, the Breton-Welsh-Cornish axis is not dealt with. Of the Scots only Sorley Maclean (and Hugh MacDiarmid) get more than a mention. But what of Seán O Ríordáin and Máirtín Ó Direáin? Is Máirtín Ó Cadhain's 'Cré na Cille'  (1949) worth only a couple of sentences? In another publication - 'The Pleasures of Gaelic Poetry' (Ed. Seán Mac Réamoinn, Allen Lane Penguin Books Ltd 1982) - Seán Ó Tuama states that Ó Ríordáin's second book (Brosna) was  -
One of the most distinguished collections of verse ever published in Ireland', and that 'He and Ó Direáin amongst our poets, and Máirtín Ó Cadhain amongst our fiction-writers, have re-vitalized the Irish language, fitted it out for the contemporary mind'
I now realize what bothered me about the present volume's title - its presumption. Thus we are presented with a so-called 'Celtic Renaissance', often interpreted with the astounding chauvinism of the English-speaker - 
"(Synge) argued fiercely against the Gaelic League's intention of restoring Irish as the vernacular of Ireland. This he saw as a retrogressive step likely to halt the intellectual development of Ireland ... I think Synge was right in this matter and Hyde (founder of Gaelic League) wrong" (Lorna Reynolds, Prof. Emeritus Univ. Coll. Galway, co-editor, with Robert O'Driscoll, of five volumes in the Yeats Studies Series
     So, carefully sparing ourselves the angst of actual Celtic-speakers, we can now indulge our hypocritical (?) Celtic nostalgia to its romantic full -
"The Celt, in the stories collected or created by the writers of the Revival, is not concerned with probability or necessity, but only with the expression of emotion. He perceives the correspondence between sensuous form and super-sensuous meaning and recognizes instinctively the spirit that gives a voice to the dumb things that surround him. Not distinguishing clearly between the natural and the supernatural, and believing that all nature is full of invisible spirits that can be perceived by those willing to look beyond the cobweb veil of the sense, the Celt sees everything as enchanted" (O'Driscoll, pp 409, 410)
     Or this from Demarco -
"To our sophisticated modern world, the Celts represent the nebulous in-between states of human experience, twilight as the mid-way point between dark and day, material and spiritual; mist as the poetic creation of water and air; the shore line as the demarcation between solid and liquid matter; dreaming as the state between sleep and waking" (p 250). 
     Thus miasmic swamp-mist-icism finally engulfs us and, lost forever to the world of mortals, we head off in giddy pursuit of the elusive ignis fatuus. 
Another question. By what perverse logic can we fete 'Celtic Consciousness' as of crucial relevance for our age, while simultaneously we disdain the channel and supreme bequest of that consciousness (i.e. Celtic Language) as inimical to our intellect? Can we ingest the consciousness and refuse the language, as we consume a nut-kernel and throw away the shell? Things are not so simple. We unhusk this nut only to instantaneously encapsulate it with a new shell - our own (English) language - the language which has moulded the shape of our consciousness - and which now moulds (and flavours) whatever Celtic pâté we might cram into it. In making the nut conducive to the English-speaker's palate, its form and texture (not to mention its nutritional value) are fundamentally altered. To change the figure, music scored for a specific instrument may be rendered on another; the melody endures, but the experience, the impact, the 'quality' is very different. Think of Bach transposed from organ to guitar. The music undergoes re-interpretation - reincarnation. Think of ceòl mòr transposed to port à beul. Or ceòl beag to fiddle. And where words are concerned the distance travelled is vastly greater than in instrumental music. One of Jorge Luis Borges excellent short stories, "Pierre Menard, Autor del Quijote" (from "Ficciones) descibes the perfect translation of Don Quijote de la Mancha. This "perfect" translation necessarily retains every rhythm, sound and semantic nuance of the original. It is in fact indistinguishable from the original!    
     Anyone who reads a poem in an original language followed by an English translation (Sorley Maclean's 'Coilltean Ratharsair', for example - both versions being happily present in this book) must frequently, if not always, be struck either by the comparative poverty of the English (as in the case cited), or by a 'virtuoso' translation's liberty-taking with the original. This is not to argue the futility of translating, but that more is lost in transit than is often realized, particularly by a complacent reader of English, who finds it all too easy to exist on translations. The host language, to avoid its own violation, distorts as it devours. Otherwise, like the boa constrictor which swallows the water buffalo, it takes on an unrecognizably alien shape. Compare, for example, post-Conquest Anglo-Saxon which, having failed to successfully digest Norman-French Consciousness, undergoes the inevitable fate of metamorphosis in the hybrid register of Chaucer. 
     In reference to French and a variant of Anglo-Saxon, it is interesting, amusing even, to read what the French of Léon de Wailly, 1843, makes of a couple of lines from Burns's My Luve is Like a Red, Red, Rose, namely "And I will luve thee still, my Dear, Till a’ the seas gang dry". De Wailly accomplishes the no-mean feat of making his French sound as capiteux as a pile of broken bricks -  
"Et je continuerai de t’aimer, ma chère, Jusqu’à ce que les mers soient à sec."   
     Rather more poetic, but correspondingly less literal, is the Gaelic rendition of Roderick MacDonald - 
"'S gu sìorraidh chaoidh cha trèig mi thu, Fhads a bhios muir air tràigh". 
     My proposition is simply this  - change consciousness, change language; change language, change consciousness. The British classes verbally signal their differing wave-lengths. One current of "Black" consciousness in the USA has sought linguistic equivalence. George Steiner argues (Language and Silence) that Nazi consciousness practically ruined the German language, particularly for poetry. Classical Renaissance thinking brought with it resurrected classical speech, and consequently invaded the vernacular tongues with Graeco-latinisms (largely bypassing peripheralised Gaelic, of course). 
     Up until the 16th Century, the term "Scot" in its various forms referred to someone of Gaelic-speech, whether from Ireland or Scotland. In fact in earlier times Ireland was known as "Scotia". Cf the 10th Century Sanas Cormaic -
Ba mór cumachta Gaedel for Bretnaib, ocus niba luga do-threbtais Gaedil for muir anair quam in Scotia" (The power of the Gael over the British was great, and the Gael lived no less to the east of the sea quam in Scotia (than in Ireland)" The Irish Language by Máirtín Ó Murchú, Gnéithe dar nDúchas 10, Dept of Foreign Affairs & Bord na Gaeilge, Dublin 1985)
     When the Scottish State eventually switched from Gaelic to Inglis it moved from Celtic to Teutonic consciousness. By the 16th Century Inglis is now "our awin langage" and is called "Scottis" to distinguish it from Sudroun (Southern English, or English English). Cf a few lines of Gawin Douglas (c 1475-1522) from the Prologue to his translation of The Aeneid -
"As that I culd, to make it braid and plain.
Kepand nae sudroun, but our awin langage,
and speakis as I learit when I was page...
Nor yet sae clean all sudroun I refuse,
but sum word I pronunce as nichtbour does;
Like as in Latin been Greek termes sum,
So me behuvit whilom, or than be dum,
Sum bastard Latin, French, or Inglis oiss, (oiss=use)
Whar scant were Scottis I had nae uther choiss"
     So in his apologia here, Douglas (Gaelic "Dubh Ghlas", "Black Water") explains that rather than "be dum" if he lacks a word in "Scottis" (ie the Scottish variant of northern Anglo-Saxon) he has felt himself justified in his use (oiss) of some form of Latin, French or (Southern) English. This literary virtuoso with the Gaelic name must have rubbed shoulders almost daily with Gaelic-speakers. He almost certainly (as the gifted linguist he was, not to mention in his office as Bishop of Dunkeld) would have been able, at the very least, to "get by" in Gaelic himself. Yet now when his "awin langage" of Inglis/Scottis fails him he has "nae uther choiss" than recourse to one of the three languages he mentions. Gaelic (speech of the "Scots" for millenia before him) is not on his mental map! (Of course the Edinburgh Government soon became determined to extirpate Gaelic from all maps, - cf the Statutes of Iona, 1609).
     The Scottish State's move from Inglis/Scottis to Sudroun/English marks another, though less fundamental shift of consciousness. The latest stage of our linguistic 'evolution' - Americanization - proceeds apace (my own Canadian mental substratum having given me a "head"-start). It would be neat, if simplistic, to argue that in terms of Scottish consciousness Lallans is devolution while Gaelic is independence. An interesting comparison would be the 20th Century Jewish debate over the relative merits of a (Germanic) Yiddish and a revived Hebrew.The reality in Scotland is dauntingly complex. There are no monoglot Gaels, Gaelic-speaking adults (in 1983) having all been educated through English (reminding us that, under our Scottish system, 'education' has long meant 'deracination'). Gaels make up only around 1% of the Scottish population. Gaels, like everyone else, are overwhelmingly influenced by the mass media, and that Media, on the whole, uses but one medium - English. This gives rise (understandably) to a kind of schizoid di-glossia among Gaelic-speakers - Gaelic for the home; English for officialdom. 
                                                                                                                   
***
     Your language speaks you. Like those intertwined beard-pullers from the Book of Kells, language and consciousness have each other by the throat. In this contentious symbiosis now one partner prevails, now the other. Most often it is consciousness which yields to the strangle-hold of language, but on the rare occasion the brute's grip is broken and it is forced to cry 'Uncle', or indeed any other combination of syllables which the newly emancipated consciousness gleefully dictates. One such inspiring moment came with James Joyce. More than one writer (O'Driscoll, De Paor, Neil Bartlett) compares Finnegans Wake to theBook of Kells in its love of multi-faceted intricacy ('barely controlling an explosive anarchy' - De Paor). The Wake, with its chameleon-type words, is presented as the fruit of the marriage of Celtic Genius to the English language. But, I ask, if it is successful as Celtic Consciousness, is it successful as English? If English must endure such tribulations to adequately express Celtic Consciousness is not its unsuitability for the task proven, rather than the contrary? And, as far as this 'Celtic' hypothesis is valid, would Joyce not have found a more sympathetic medium in Irish? The crucial fact is, though, that Joyce's love-affair was not with Irish, but with English; indeed it has been argued that it was his passion for English which spurred him to write at all -
"Ba scríbhneoir é James Joyce toisc gur thug sé gean a chroí go fíochmhar don Bhéarla. D'fhéadfá a rá nach raibh aon ábhar eile aige seachas an cumann rúnda idir a shamhlaíocht féin agus an Bhéarla" 
("James Joyce was a writer because of an intense/fierce commitment to the English language. It could be said that he had no other subject-matter than the mystical communion between his own imagination and English.) - Alan Titley (Scríobh 5. Ed. Seán Ó Mórdha, 1981)
     The practical results of this commitment of Joyce are a more malleable English and an expanded consciousness for the English-speaker. My central argument therefore is this - authentic commitment to Celtic Consciousness ought to involve a 'fierce' commitment to Celtic Language, because the stretching of that Language means the expansion of that Consciousness. Commitment to Celtic Consciousness therefore means not just being au fait with translations from the Celtic (the ultimate in 'Gaelic without Groans'), nor even actively translating Celtic literature into English (which, as has just been pointed out, is inevitably far more concerned with the consciousness of the English-speaker than of the Celtic-speaker). Commitment to Celtic Consciousness means writing in Celtic for the Celt; the translation of English and world classics into Celtic; the determination to stretch Celtic like a drum-skin round the outermost rim of the cosmos and then hammer a tune on it; a resolve that the Celtic tongues will have a future as well as a past. And that last is surely one of the great creative challenges of our day. 
     Liam De Paor describes how the Celts lavished delicate craftsmanship on their armaments, by that very act expressing a disdain of death. Here we have an appropriate symbol for Celtic language - a finely wrought shield, inlayed with jewels, summation of millenia of craftsmanship, confronting now, as ever, death. Let us make no mistake; when the shield falls, the warrior follows. Without the protection of Celtic Language, Celtic Consciousness will be nought but a bonehaunting wraith, mute to all but the self-deluding romantic and the self-proclaiming psychic, its diaphanous form manifest only on photographs of whose authenticity we can never be sure. And should we unearth and reconstruct its bones it would be but a pseudo-resurrection - a nerveless marionette articulated by an alien mind.
     Finally, for another (gentle) glimpse of Celtic Consciousness consider the following (translated) note, discovered in the margin of a manuscript laboured over by an early Irish monk (quoted in the article 'Celtic Calligraphy' by Liam Miller and Pat Musick)-
"Let me not be blamed for the script, for the ink is bad and the vellum defective, and the day is dark."
Fearghas MacFhionnlaigh