mercredi, mars 31, 2010

Dooyeweerd: Theoretical & Non-theoretical Judgments/ Teòiriceach is Di-theòiriceach

Albrecht Altdorfer "Buaidh Alasdair Mhòir aig Issu" 1529
Breithneachadh teòiriceach agus di-theòiriceach. Chan eil an seòrsa deireannach di-loidigeach idir, ach dìreach neo-"gegenständlich".
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Theoretical and non-theoretical judgments. The latter are never a-logical, but merely non-"gegenständlich".
     As we have shown before in our transcendental criticism of theoretic thought, the matter stands thus: theoretical judgments are abstract, distinguishing and combining modal meanings. They embody theoretical knowledge, which exists in an intermodal synthesis of meaning between the logical aspect of thought and the modal meaning of an a-logical aspect of our experience which has been made into a "Gegenstand".
     These judgments are subjected to the norm of theoretical truth, which holds for scientific knowledge.
     The non-theoretical, so-called "practical" judgments are not a-logical — no judgment can be a-logical — but merely non-"gegenständlich", i.e. not grounded in the theoretical attitude of knowledge, which sets the logical aspect of thought in contrast to the abstracted a-logical aspect of experience.
     They are subjected to the norm of pre-theoretical truth, which holds for pre-scientific knowledge but possesses universal validity as well as the norm of theoretical truth (1).
     As all temporal truth is based on the temporal coherence of meaning of the logical and the non-logical aspects of reality, it points out beyond itself to the fulness of meaning of verity, which is given only in the religious totality of meaning of our cosmos in its relation to the Origin.
     With respect to its meaning every judgment appeals to the fulness of truth, in which no temporal restriction any longer has meaning. For verity does not allow any limitation as to its fulness of meaning.
     He who thus relativizes its validity to a would-be "pure" theoretical thought, and at the same time recognizes that the theoretical scientific judgments do not exhaust the realm of judgments, falls into the logical self-refutation of scepticism.
     For, on the one hand, he denies the fulness of truth by relativizing this latter to the special realm of the theoretical, in distinction from the non-theoretical. Yet, on the other hand, he requires for his conception full validity of truth without any restriction (2).

LITT's distinction between theoretical and "weltanschauliche" truth and the self-refutation of this distinction in the sense in which LITT intends it.
     LITT makes a sharp distinction between truth in its proper sense of theoretical universally valid verity and the "so-called" "truth of a life- and world-view". In itself, this distinction might make good sense, were it not that LITT actually denies all "weltanschauliche Wahrheit".
     For, used with the latter signification, the word "truth" in his view would be merely a predicate, applied to assertions of a life- and world-view, in order thereby to express: "the unmutilated integrity with which a thinker makes confession of his interpretation of life to himself and to others, the inner consistency with which he develops it, the convincing force, with which he knows how to represent and support it and... the agreement between it and his actual behaviour in life" [loc. cit., p. 255: "Die ungeschminkte Aufrichtigkeit, mit der ein Denker sich vor sich selbst und anderen zu seiner Lebensdeutung bekennt, die innere Folgerichtigkeit mit der er sie entwickelt, die überzeugende Kraft, mit der er sie vorzutragen und zu begründen weisz und...die Übereinstimmung zwischen ihr und seiner tätigen Bewährung im Leben."].

The inner contradiction of this dualism. The meaninglessness of judgments, which are alleged not to be subjected to the norm of truth.
     However, as soon as we attempt seriously to carry through this conception, it appears to dissolve itself in inner contradiction. For, if the judgments which a life- and world-view provides are not subjected to a universally-valid norm of truth, they lose all meaning. They are really no judgments, and so cannot contain an individual "interpretation of life".
     For a subjective "interpretation of life" which is expressed in a series of judgments, makes sense only, if our temporal cosmos in which we live, actually exists as a coherence of meaning. If this is the case, the judgments in which that interpretation is given are necessarily subjected to a universally valid norm of truth, in accordance with which my subjective interpretation should agree with the true state of affairs; in other words, the question is whether or not the judgment is true with respect to the meaning of our cosmos. However, if there is no universally-valid truth with respect to the latter, then I can give no subjective "interpretation of life" either. For I can interpret only that of which I can judge truly that it has a meaning, even though I should personally leave undecided the verity of my individual interpretation.
     LITT now supposes, that he can escape these destructive consequences of his standpoint by making theoretical truth in its universal validity the judge as to essence, meaning and limits of the so-called "weltanschauliche Wahrheit". Thus the judgments of the life- and world-view again appear to be subjected to the really mysterious "universally valid theoretical truth" — but only in order immediately to release them again from every norm of verity. For, the universally valid truth in this respect turns out to be that the judgments of the life- and world-view, as assertions of a merely individual impression of life, are situated "beyond truth and falsity".
     For LITT, by reason of the transcendental basic Idea of his philosophical system, is, as we saw, still more averse to an intellectualistic philosophy than RICKERT. "Truth" must be restricted to the theoretical realm, if theoretical thought is not again, in the old intellectualistic way, to dominate the life- and world-view of the sovereign personality.
     If, however, he persists in the view that, for example, the judgments: "God is the Creator of the world, which He has created to His glory", and indeed: "Religion has to give way to science", are situated "beyond truth and falsity", because they comprise merely individual interpretations of life, then it is necessary to draw the full consequences of this conception. For in this case there cannot even exist any universally valid truth with respect to the totality of meaning of our temporal world either (which indeed according to LITT'S own admission is more than merely theoretical) and its relation to the modal diversity of meaning.
     If this consequence too is accepted, then the meaning of a life- and world-view as well as that of philosophic theoretical thought must be denied together with the meaning of "theoretical truth". Theoretical thought has then annihilated its own foundations.
     For philosophic thought is directed to the totality of meaning. However, if there exists no universally valid truth as to the relationship of totality, particularity and coherence of meaning, then philosophic thought has no norm of truth either, by which it may be tested.
     The pole of absolute scepticism is hereby attained, and consequently the pole of complete self-refutation.
     The concept of an "absolute merely theoretical truth" dissolves itself in inner contradiction. Our transcendental critique, however, penetrates behind the logical contradictions, in which the doctrine of the self-sufficiency of "pure theoretical truth" is entangled, to the root of this doctrine and exposes the relativistic bottom on which it builds its theoretical system. Only on the basis of its relativistic religious attitude, can the emphasis be explained, with which this school in modern times tries to safeguard at least theoretical truth against the invasion of relativism, which for a long time has undermined its life- and world-views.
     An intrinsically Christian philosophy does not need to learn from the Humanistic ideal of personality, that theoretical thought cannot dominate religion and a life- and world-view. But Humanistic philosophy may learn from our transcendental criticism that, on the contrary, philosophic thought is dependent upon the religious ground-motive of the thinking ego.
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(1) In our treatment of the problem of knowledge, we shall show, that theoretical truth cannot stand alongside of the pre theoretical, but that they make appeal to each other in a deeper sense.
(2) This antinomy goes back to a basic antinomy in the transcendental idea of the thinker. For, on the one hand, he cannot locate the totality of meaning in the theoretical, because, in that case, the personality-ideal with its a-theoretical "values" would be relegated to a corner. But, on the other hand, he supposes he can find his Archimedean point in theoretical thought. A merely logical antinomy does not exist, as we shall see later.
(Herman Dooyeweerd, New Critique of Theoretical Thought, Vol I, pp 153-156)

mardi, mars 30, 2010

Dooyeweerd: De Nachtwacht

Rembrandt "De Nachtwacht" (1642)
An diofar eadar breithneachadh teòiriceach is neo-theòiriceach. Am breugnachadh a-staigh ma tha inbhe-fìrinne cuingichte ris a' chiad fhear. 
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The distinction between theoretical and a-theoretical judgments. The inner contradiction of a restriction of the validity of truth to the former.
     The consequence of LITT's conception (which RICKERT also had to take, although he persisted in calling all judgments theoretical (1) is, that a sharp distinction must be made between theoretical judgments on the one hand, and a-theoretical judgments of valuation on the other, and that only the former can lay claim to universal validity of truth. Measured by this criterion, the judgment "This rose is beautiful", for example, or the judgment "This action is immoral" is withdrawn from this universal validity.
     This entire distinction, however, (which goes back to KANT's dualistic transcendental ground-Idea with its cleavage between theoretical knowledge and apriori rational faith) is untenable and cancels itself when it is thought out.
     For there exists no meaningful judgment of valuation, which does not at once, as a judgment, lay claim to validity of truth. An aesthetic or moral judgment as formulated above, with respect to its full intention must run as follows: "This rose is in truth beautiful" and "This action is in truth immoral", respectively. For these judgments imply the supposition: there exists a universally valid standard of aesthetic and moral valuation and to this rose and this action, respectively, the predicates "beautiful" and "immoral" are truly ascribed in my judgment (2). This is the case, even though he who asserts the judgment is incapable of rendering a theoretical account of this supposition.
     Whoever denies this state of affairs, which is rooted in the fact, that no single modal aspect of our temporal cosmos is self-sufficient (but rather each refers to the inter-modal coherence of meaning), denies thereby the meaning of aesthetic and moral judgments themselves. He cuts through the coherence of meaning among the logical, the aesthetic and the moral law-spheres and can no longer allow even the principle of contradiction to be valid for the so-called "a-theoretical" judgments.
     If a man standing before REMBRANDT's "Night-Watch", in opposition to the predominant conception, were to call this masterpiece un-aesthetic, un-lovely and at the same time would claim: "There exists no universally valid norm for aesthetic valuation", he would fall into the same contradiction as the sceptic who denies a universally-valid truth. He can try to defend himself, by making the reservation: I for one think this painting unlovely. But then it has no meaning to set this subjective impression against the generally predominant view. If this critic should also concede this, and so refrains from pressing his opinion upon others, then his judgment becomes meaningless as an aesthetic judgment. In other words, it is then no longer an aesthetic judgment, since it lacks aesthetic qualification and determinateness.
     Every subjective valuation receives its determinateness by being subjected to a norm, which determines the subjectivity and defines it in its meaning! There exists no aesthetic subjectivity apart from a universally valid aesthetic norm to which it is subjected.
     Let it not be objected here, that the beauty of the "Night-Watch" is so thoroughly individual, that it cannot be exhausted in universally valid aesthetic norms.
     For individuality is proper to the subjective as such, and the "Night-Watch", without possible contradiction, is the objective realization of a completely individual, subjective-aesthetic conception. But this is not the point here. The question is only whether the judgment: "The 'Night-Watch' is beautiful", really has a universally-valid meaning or not. If not, then it does not make sense either to say, that the "Night-Watch" is a great work of art. If so, then the judgment must necessarily make claim to universally-valid truth. Tertium non datur!
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1 Cf. e.g. System der Phil., p. 388. But it may not be denied that, for example the expression: "Truth is the highest value" is a judgment, which, in RICKERT'S own view, can never be called a theoretical judgment, because it proceeds from a life- and world-view. Besides, as is well known, for RICKERT the theoretical judgments too are oriented to a (theoretical) value.
2 RICKERT, 10C. cit. p. 388 supposes that the explicit assertion that something is beautiful, insofar as we seek to found this judgment theoretically, should be a theoretical judgment about the "aesthetic value", and that in such a judgment the characteristic aesthetic attitude, which according to him lacks a universally valid standard, is in fact abandoned. The art lover, however, who is not at all related theoretically to the work of art, but who, in the full contemplation of the work, asserts the judgment "This work of art is beautiful" wants just as well, and necessarily so, to imply the truth of his assertion in this non-theoretical judgment. To claim, with RICKERT, that such a non theoretical aesthetic judgment is impossible, is simply untenable. Besides, if aesthetic valuation were to know no tension between norm and aesthetic object, as RICKERT pretends, why then do I distinguish beautiful and ugly in my a-theoretical appreciation of art?
(Herman Dooyeweerd, New Critique of Theoretical Thought, Vol I, pp 151-153)

Dooyeweerd: Litt & Weltanschauungslehre

Peantadh Clasaigeach [guó huà 国画] Sìonach
AN GRUNND-IDÈA TAR-CHEUMNAIL AGUS BRÌGH NA FÌRINNE.
Neo-chomasachd sheallaidhean-beatha is -saoghail a tha neodrach a-thaobh reilidein. Chan eil coincheap na fìrinne tur-theòiriceach a-chaoidh ri linn brìgh. 
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THE TRANSCENDENTAL GROUND-IDEA AND THE MEANING OF TRUTH.
The impossibility of an authentic religiously neutral theory of the life- and world-views. The concept of truth is never purely theoretical with respect to its meaning.
     On account of its immanent theoretical character philosophy has to give a theoretical account of a life- and world-view, with which it is, however, united in its religious root. It cannot accomplish this task, however, until it attains to critical self-reflection with respect to its transcendental ground-Idea.
     As little as it can be religiously neutral itself, so little can it give a neutral theory of the life- and world-views.
     No single philosophic "Weltanschauungslehre" is neutral, inasmuch as it cannot be neutral with respect to the material meaning of truth, not even in a sceptical relativism that upsets all foundations of philosophic theory.
     LITT considers life- and world-views, as bound in "a dialectical unity" with philosophy (loc. cit. pp. 251ff) and interprets them as concrete personal confessions of the individual struggle between person and cosmos. Philosophy, which should remain a science of a universally valid character, must, according to him, surmount the content of these confessions regarded as "something merely concrete, i.e. purely individual and limited", although the impulse to philosophic thought has originated out of this same concrete "view of life". The irrationalist Humanistic ideal of personality which is the basic factor in the transcendental Idea of LITT's dialectical system at once discloses itself in this secularized irrationalist and personalist outlook on a life- and world-view.
     To be sure, LITT may in this manner interpret his own life- and world-view; but if he claims "universal validity" and "absolute truth" for this philosophic outlook on every life- and world-view, then in the nature of the case there is no question of "theoretical neutrality", and there can be no question of it, since otherwise he would have to abandon his own Humanistic vision as to the meaning of truth.
     The whole hypostatization of "pure" dialectical thought serves only to release human personality, in its interpretation of life, from every norm of truth, and to loosen its individuality from the bond of a law. Hence the conflict against all "universally-valid norms and values" by which a rationalistic or semi-rationalistic Humanism still wished to bind that individuality in the human person.
     We find as little neutrality in RICKERT'S theory of life- and world-views.
     In him, too, there exists a religious unity in the meaning that he ascribes to his theoretical concept of truth, and in his proclamation of the sovereignty of personality loosed from the norm of truth in the choice of its life- and world-view. Only he stops half-way on the road to irrationalism, and still holds fast to formal universally-valid values and norms of reason.
     By wresting the life- and world-views into the theoretical scheme of his philosophy of values, in the nature of the case he theoretically falsifies the meaning of every life- and world-view that rejects the religious starting-point of this philosophy.
     How can one, for example, interpret the Calvinistic life- and world-view theoretically as a "theistic" one, grounded in the choice of the "value of holiness" as "highest value", to which as subjective commitment ("Subjectsverhalten") "piety" answers and as "good" the "world of gods" (thus RICKERT'S sixth type!) ?
     It is evident, that here, in a religious aprioristic manner, a Humanistic-idealist meaning is inserted in the transcendental theoretical Idea of truth, which in advance cuts off an unprejudiced understanding of a life- and world-view with a different religious foundation.
     The dependence of the meaning which a philosophic system reads into in the theoretical concept of truth, upon the transcendental ground-Idea appears from a confrontation of the various conceptions of verity, which immanence-philosophy has developed. By way of illustration, compare the nominalist view of HOBBES with the realistic and metaphysical conception of ARISTOTLE. In HOBBES truth and falsehood are considered only as attributes of language and not of "things". According to HOBBES the exact truth consists only in the immanent agreement of concepts with each other on the basis of conventional definitions (cf. LEVIATHAN. Part I, 4). In ARISTOTLE truth consists in the agreement of the judgment with the metaphysical essence of the things judged. Also compare KANT'S transcendental-logical, idealistic concept of truth with HUME'S psychologistic one; or the mathematical concept of truth of a DESCARTES with the dialectical view of a HEGEL or LITT, to say nothing of the pragmatic concept of scientific verity in the modern Humanistic philosophy of life, and in existentialism.
     The supposition that, if the validity of truth is but restricted to pure theory, the meaning of verity can be determined in a "universally-valid fashion", is based on self-deception.
     The consequence of the postulate of neutrality would actually have to be the allocation of the concept of truth to a personal choice of a life- and world-view.

Immanence-philosophy recognizes no norm of truth above its transcendental ground-Idea.
     Actually, immanence-philosophy recognizes no norm of truth above its transcendental ground-Idea. In fact, the dogma concerning the autonomy of theoretical reason — especially in its Humanistic sense — hands truth over to the subjective commitment of the apostate personality. Therefore it is in vain that transcendental idealism attempts a refutation of the relativistic view of verity by means of logical arguments only.
     Truth admits of no restriction to the theoretical-logical sphere as regards its fulness and temporal coherence of meaning. The validity of truth necessarily extends as far as the realm of judgments extends.
(Herman Dooyeweerd, New Critique of Theoretical Thought, Vol I, pp 148-151)

Dooyeweerd: Litt & Self-refutation of Scepticism/ Litt & Fèin-bhreugnachadh Sgeipteachais

Peantadh Clasaigeach [guó huà 国画] Sìonach 
"Fèin-bhreugnachadh sgeipteachais" lùghdaichte do a fhìor mheud. 
The "self-refutation of scepticism" reduced to its true proportion.
     So the self-refutation of scepticism, in which RICKERT and LITT alike focus the force of their argument, can actually have nothing to do with a pretended self-guarantee of merely theoretical truth.
     Let us try to reduce it to its true proportions. Then the state of affairs appears to be that logical thought in its subjectivity is
necessarily subjected to the logical laws, in casu — the "principium contradictionis" (principle of contradiction).
     If anybody is to think theoretically, he ought to begin by recognizing the validity of this principle, which is in no sense absolute and "unconditioned", but rather of a cosmic-temporal character. Does this mean, that other creatures, or God Himself, could set aside the principle of non-contradiction in their thought? If this question is to have a meaning, one must proceed from the supposition that God Himself, or e.g. the angels, also would have to think in a cosmic temporal fashion. For, as a matter of fact, human thought is able to proceed in setting aside the principle of non-contradiction; e.g. the whole "dialectic logic" does so. But whoever would suppose this "thought" in the case of God and the angels, supposes at the same time, that they are included in the cosmic temporal order and that they are subjected to the laws that rule therein, although they can transgress them in so far as they have a norm-character. Quod absurdum! and with respect to the sovereign God: Quod blasphenium!
     From the time of Greek Sophism, sceptical relativism has been characterized by its primary denial that thought is subjected to a norm of truth. It is an irrationalism in the epistemological field.
     Actually this denial must necessarily lead to antinomy, so far as the judgment: "There is no truth" must itself be tested by the norm of verity. Does, however, this judgment in its claim to truth, imply the validity of an absolute, self-sufficient theoretical verity? In no way! He who says: "There is no truth", intends this statement in the first place against the validity of a norm of verity in the temporal coherence of meaning. Furthermore, he directs it in the most absolute sense also against the supratemporal totality and Origin of truth. Thereby, he necessarily entangles himself in the antinomy, that his very judgment makes claim to a verity, which must be the full one.
     LITT's proclamation of the self-sufficiency of theoretical truth, however, must lead to the same sceptical relativism and consequently to the same antinomy. Consistently thought out, it can recognize no norm which dominates the absolutized "transcendental-logical subject", since it declares the subjective 'cogito' to be sovereign and proclaims it to be the ἀρχή of all meaning and order.
     How could subjective theoretical thought still be viewed as self-sufficient, if it were acknowledged, that it is subject to a law, which it has not itself imposed?
     In LITT's line of thought, the "transcendental cogito" does not belong to the full temporal reality in its indissoluble correlation of cosmonomic side and subject-side. Reality in the "Gegebenheitskorrelation" [i.e. the datum-correlation] is seen only in the absolutized individuality, which is ascribed to the "concrete ego" itself. It is as little subjected to laws, as the "transcendental ego", but is understood as the absolute irrational which can be objectivized only in the "Erkenntniskorrelation" (correlation of knowledge) and conceived by the "transcendental-logical ego" in universally valid thought forms.
     Nowhere in LITT's philosophy does the cosmic law really have a place in its original inseparable correlation to the individual subjectivity that is subjected to it. The "pure thinking subject" with its reflective and objectivizing thought-forms is itself the "universally valid" and the origin of all universal validity.
     The "theoretical universal validity" originating from the "autonomous" selfhood (which identifies itself with its transcendental-logical
function in the will to "pure thought") is the substitute for the cosmic order and its different modal law-spheres to which all individual subjectivity is subjected according to God's law of creation.
     However, here arises a dialectical tension, a veritable antinomic relation between universal validity and individuality; between absolutized theoretical thought with its would-be self-sufficient absolute truth and individual subjectivity in the 'datum correlation' ("Gegebenheitskorrelation") ; between "thinking ego" and "living (experiencing) ego"; between philosophy as a universally valid theory, and a life- and world-view as an entirely individual impression of life on the part of the sovereign personality, not subjected to any norm of truth!
     In its dialectical thought philosophy has, according to LITT, eventually to establish this lawlessness of individuality. In the irrationality of life, it has to recognize its dialectical other which possesses no universal validity. It has to establish in a "universally
valid manner" the individual law-lessness of personality in its life- and world-view, in order eventually to understand its dialectical unity-in-the-opposition with that life- and worldview! For actually, dialectical "purely theoretical thought" and a "life- and world-view" as a norm-less "individual impression of life" are, in the light of LITT's transcendental ground-Idea, two dialectical emanations from the same ego, which lives in a relativistically undermined Humanistic ideal of personality.
     The absolutizing of the "transcendental cogito" to a self-sufficient, "unconditioned", "sovereign" instance implies, that "pure thought" is not subjected to a cosmic order, in which the laws of logical thought too, are grounded. Since theoretical reason also tries to create the coherence of meaning between its logical aspect and the other modal aspects of our cosmos, the result is a dialectical mode of thought, which relativizes in an expressly logical way the basic laws of logic as norms and limits of our subjective logical function.
     How can such "dialectical thought" subject itself to a veritable norm of truth that stands above it? The absolutizing of theoretical truth, which amounts to the dissolution of its meaning, is the work of the apostate selfhood, that will not subject itself to the laws established by the Ἀρχή of every creature, and therefore ascribes to its dialectical thought a sovereignty surmounting all boundaries of laws. To LITT, the criterion of all relativism resides in the denial of the self-sufficiency of "purely theoretical" truth. By this time, we have seen how the proclamation of this self-sufficiency is in truth nothing but the primary absolutizing of theoretical thought itself, which is the fountain of all relativism, since it denies the fulness of meaning of verity and up-roots theoretical thought.
     The "self-refutation of scepticism" is at the same time the self-refutation of the neutrality-postulate and of the conception of theoretical thought as self-sufficient !
     But that self-refutation may not be overestimated in its proportion. For, in the last analysis, it proves no more than that whoever will think theoretically has to subject himself to a theoretical norm of truth which cannot have originated from that thought itself ; for this norm has meaning only in the coherence of meaning and in relation to the totality of truth, to the fulness of verity, which, exactly as fulness, must transcend theoretical thought itself, and thus can never be "purely theoretical".
     That self-refutation which manifests itself in the contradiction, in which logical thought turning against its own laws necessarily entangles itself, cannot of itself lead us to the positive knowledge of verity.
     It is merely a logical criterion of truth, which is not selfsufficient.
     For in the conception of the full material meaning of truth, philosophy exhibits its complete dependence upon its transcendental basic Idea as the ultimate theoretical expression of its religious ground-motive.
Theodor Litt (1880-1962)
The test of the transcendental ground-Idea.
     In applying the test of the transcendental ground-idea to LITT's philosophical system, we come to the surprising result, that there is still less question of an authentic rationalistic bent with him than with RICKERT. In his dialectical thought, LITT rather inclines to the pole of the irrationalist philosophy of life, which he has simply brought under dialectical thought-forms. The absolutizing of dialectical thought that is considered to be elevated above a "borniertes gegenständliches Denken" (a narrowly restricted kind of objective thought holding itself to the principle of noncontradiction) points, in the light of LITT's conception of individuality, to the opposite of a rationalistic hypostatization of universal laws. In this respect LITT actually exhibits a strong kinship with HEGEL, whose so-called "pan-logism" is as little to be understood rationalistically, but discloses its true intentions only against the background of the irrationalist turn of the Humanistic ideal of personality in Romanticism! In general, dialectic thought has an anti-rationalist tendency.
     LITT's dialectical philosophy, measured by its own criterion, is an "irrationalist life- and world-view" in the would-be universally-valid forms of dialectical thought, an irrationalistic logicism, oriented historically.
     But we, who apply another criterion, can recognize no dialectical unity of philosophy and a life- world-view, but rather find the deeper unity of the two in their religious ground-motive. The content of LITT's transcendental ground-Idea is determined by an irrationalist turn of the Humanistic freedom-motive in its dialectical tension with the motive of scientific domination of nature, which has undergone a fundamental depreciation in his philosophy.
(Herman Dooyeweerd, New Critique of Theoretical Thought, Vol I, pp 144-148)